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Abstract
Exchange rate regime choice and the macroeconomic consequences of that choice 
have been among the most controversial and important issues in open economy 
macroeconomics. This thesis, comprising three essays, analyses three previously
unexplored determinants and the consequences of de facto, or actual, exchange rate 
regime choice during the post–Bretton Woods period.
The first essay explores the role of capital account openness and financial sector 
health as possible determinants of de facto exchange rate regime choice. Further, for 
the first time, the essay examines the persistence of regime choice over time. Due 
importance is given to regime choices by different country groups, such as low-
income, middle-income and high-income countries. The essay uses the Reinhart-
Rogoff de facto exchange rate classification and a panel dataset covering the post–
Bretton Woods period of 1971 to 2007, for a large number of countries. The 
empirical methodology includes dynamic panel data models with system GMM, and 
a static model with fixed effects and random effects estimation techniques. The
essay finds that regime choice is relatively persistent over time for low-income and 
high-income countries, while such persistence does not exist for middle-income 
countries. The study also finds robust evidence that capital account openness is 
associated with fixed exchange rate regimes, particularly for low- and middle-
income countries. The analysis also provides some evidence that financial 
development is another important determinant of regime choice. It is found that
countries with underdeveloped financial sectors are not good candidates for flexible 
exchange rate policies. Therefore, low-income countries generally appear to be the 
reluctant floaters. The effect of another measure of financial sector health—namely, 
financial sector fragility—on regime choice remains largely insignificant.
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The second essay investigates whether product diversification influences the 
exchange rate regime choice and the mechanisms through which this effect may 
operate. This essay identifies three possible mechanisms through which 
diversification and regime choice may be related—namely, the shock absorption, 
financial development and rent-seeking mechanisms. A direct effect of
diversification on regime choice is also hypothesised. By using a cross-country 
dataset covering 125 countries from 1971 to 2000, and by adopting instrumental 
variables estimation together with identification-through-heteroskedasticity 
methodologies, this essay runs a ‘horse race’ among the hypothesised effects. The 
relative importance of all these factors is also gauged empirically. The strongest 
effects are found to be those of the direct effect and rent-seeking mechanisms. That 
is, diversification makes countries less fearful of adopting flexible regimes, and, in 
countries where corruption is high, concentration leads to fixed regimes, as it may 
create more scope for rent-seeking by powerful elites. Diversification is also more 
likely to lead to flexible exchange rate regimes, but only in developing countries 
with lower levels of financial development. There is also some evidence that the 
shock absorption channel moderates diversification, in which case diversification 
facilitates the adoption of flexible regimes in countries experiencing greater shocks.
In consideration of the high and persistent fiscal deficit and public debt currently 
marring several economies, the third essay addresses the role of exchange rate 
regime choice in disciplining fiscal policy. There is a consensus at the theoretical 
level that exchange rate regime choice has important bearing on the conduct of fiscal 
policy; however, considerable debate continues as to which regime provides more 
fiscal discipline. Empirical studies focusing only on the direct effect of regime 
choice on fiscal discipline cannot provide a definitive answer. This study stresses 
that, apart from its direct effects, regime choice can also affect fiscal outcomes 
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through its interactions with trade openness and central bank independence. This
hypothesis is tested using different fiscal measures from two panel datasets covering 
the periods from 1971 to 2000 and 1971 to 2007, for a large number of developed 
and developing countries. This study finds strong evidence that the effect of regime 
choice on fiscal discipline critically depends on the level of trade openness. More 
specifically, estimated marginal effects show that fixed exchange rate regimes are 
more disciplinary at a low level of trade openness, while flexible regimes exert 
disciplinary effect at a high level of trade openness. However, the essay does not 
find any evidence that central bank independence has an interaction effect with 
regime choice to affect fiscal outcomes. There is also little evidence that the central 
bank independence has a direct effect on fiscal outcomes.
1Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Exchange rate regime choice is one of the central macroeconomic policy choices for 
an economy. This is because the choice of exchange rate regime has significant 
influence on the path of nominal exchange rate, which is considered one of the most 
important prices in any country. This price acts as a vital link between the domestic 
economy and the rest of the world (Williamson 2009). Further, in the event of 
domestic price stickiness, nominal exchange rate, in the short and medium term, is 
the main determinant of real exchange rate, with the latter being a key determinant 
of macroeconomic stability and motivation to trade (Williamson 2009; Frenkel and
Rapetti 2010). On the other hand, it is argued that a poor exchange rate regime
choice can lead to a number of detrimental outcomes for an economy. For instance,
probability, extent, and cost of the financial crises are tightly linked with exchange 
rate regime choice (Domac and Martinez-Peria 2003). Consequently, the type of 
exchange rate regime has been a core consideration within the International 
Monetary System (IMS).
Regarding the critical roles played by the exchange rate regime in an economy,
Friedman (1953) argues that flexible exchange rate can insulate an economy from 
real external shocks.1 Conversely, Williamson (2000, p 55) observes that flexible 
exchange rate generates ‘short-run volatility’ as well as ‘long-run misalignments’ in 
exchange rate which are not conducive for good macroeconomic performance.
Further, regime choice can influence the effectiveness of stabilisation policies,
1 Theoretically, exchange rate regimes are divided into two categories: fixed regimes and 
floating (or flexible) regimes. In this thesis, floating and flexible regimes are used 
interchangeably, which is common in exchange rate literature.
2including monetary policy and fiscal policy. For example, according to the Mundell-
Fleming model (Mundell 1963; Fleming 1962), under perfect capital mobility,
adoption of a fixed exchange rate system renders fiscal policy fully effective in 
changing output, while monetary policy becomes completely ineffective. 
Conversely, a floating exchange rate makes monetary policy extremely useful and 
fiscal policy fully neutral in affecting the output level. Thus, one of the implications 
of this model is that the adoption of a floating regime enables countries to pursue 
independent monetary policy for stabilisation, while the adoption of a fixed regime 
makes this important stabilisation tool powerless. There is also argument that a fixed 
exchange rate, itself, can act as a nominal anchor for monetary policy (Corden 
2002). All of this highlights the essential role played by exchange rate policy in any 
economy, and the importance of choosing an appropriate exchange rate regime.
These considerations together with a number of macroeconomic developments in the 
global context make the exchange rate regime choice during the post–Bretton 
Woods (post-BW) era a particularly important topic. Three features characterise the 
exchange rate regime behaviour of countries in the post-BW period. First, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)—the watchdog of the International Monetary 
System—has granted liberty to its member countries to choose their exchange rate 
regime in this period.2 This characteristic makes the post-BW era distinct from 
previous international monetary arrangements in which the choice was very limited
(Klein and Shambaugh 2010). In fact, because of this liberty, countries have adopted 
many variants of fixed and floating exchange rates, known as intermediate or in-
between regimes. For example, IMF currently distinguishes as many as 10 different 
2 This has been possible due to a 1978 amendment of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement (see 
Article IV of IMF Articles of Agreement).
3exchange rate regimes exercised by its members (see Table 1).3 ‘Hard peg’ regimes,
such as exchange rate arrangements with no separate legal tender and currency 
board arrangement, and ‘independent floating’ regime appear, respectively, in the
first and last place on the list.
A second and related characteristic is that regime choice, which was a developed 
country issue until the 1980s, has become an important policy choice for other 
groups of countries, such as low-income, middle-income and emerging economies.
More importantly, a great degree of variation in regime choice is observed both 
across and within countries and country groups over time. Thus, many different 
regimes can be observed nowadays, including dollarisation (no separate legal 
tender) in El Salvador, Ecuador and Kosovo; currency board arrangements in Hong 
Kong, Bulgaria and Djibouti; currency union in EURO area countries; fixed regimes 
in oil-exporting Arab countries; managed floating in Albania, Afghanistan, Thailand
and Turkey; and constant free-floating in the United States (US), Japan and 
Australia. Latin American countries are particularly noted for their experiments with 
virtually all types of exchange rate arrangements at different points in time (see
Frenkel and Rapetti 2010).
Third, a number of currency and financial crises, such as the crises in the European 
Monetary System (1992), Mexico (1994), East Asia (1997) and Argentina (2001),
have brought the issue of appropriate choice of exchange rate regime to the forefront 
of academic discussions and policy formulations. This debate has been stimulated 
further by the influential study of Calvo and Reinhart (2002), who observed, in the 
aftermath of the East-Asian financial crisis of 1997, that countries’ announced
regime choices differ considerably from their actual regimes. They argue that IMF’s 
3 Table 1 also reports the number of countries affiliated to different regimes in 2009 to 2011.
4de jure exchange rate regime classification, which is based on countries’ 
declarations of their regime choices, is ‘misleading’ (Reinhart and Rogoff 2004, p 
4).4 This gives rise to ‘de facto’ or actual exchange rate regime classifications which 
are based on observed behaviour of some variables such as nominal exchange rates 
and reserve. Accordingly, three de facto classifications are proposed by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), and Shambaugh (2004).5
Thus, exchange rate choice during the post-BW period is a highly debatable issue,
both at the theoretical and empirical levels.
To provide a perspective for the above-mentioned facets of exchange rate regime 
choice, an overview of the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) (RR) classification is helpful.
The RR classification distinguishes as many as 14 exchange rate categories for the 
period 1946 to 2001 (see Table 2 for a list of these categories).6 Ilzetzki, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008) extend this classification for the period 1940 to 2007 for a large 
number of countries. Table 3, presenting some trends in de facto exchange rate 
regime choice using Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) classification, shows that 
only 8% of countries were floaters in 1975. This figure almost doubled in 1985. The 
percentage of floaters increased slightly in 1990 to reach 20%, then declined slightly 
in 1995, and then dropped significantly later. At the end of 2007, a little more than 
4% of countries were floaters, which included constant floaters, such as the US, 
Japan and Australia. In contrast, the vast majority of countries followed fixed and 
4 IMF has been publishing the exchange rate arrangements of its members since 1945. 
5 Since 1998, IMF also published a de facto classification. However, until mid-2000, the 
classification was mainly based on countries’ announced behaviour. Since 2009, IMF has 
announced a ‘revised classification system’, as shown in Table 1 (see also Habermeier et al.
2009). However, panel data for this classification are not yet publicly available.
6 RR classification is based on parallel exchange rate market data, and covers the longest 
periods. Two other de facto classifications—namely, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) 
and Shambaugh (2004) have three and two categories, respectively. The main criticism of 
these classifications is that they rely on IMF official exchange rate data. As Rose (2012) 
states, these classifications ‘distrust’ IMF official classification, but rely on IMF official 
exchange rates.
5intermediate regimes throughout the sample period. The percentage of fixed regime 
countries dropped slightly from 48% in 1975 to 45% in 2007. Conversely, the 
percentage of countries following a form of intermediate regimes increased from 
43% in 1975 to 51% in 2007.
To offer an alternative picture based on country groups by income, 62% of low-
income countries adopted fixed regimes in the early period of the post-BW era. This
percentage reduced to 31% in 2007. Low-income floaters also almost halved during 
the sample period, decreasing from 10.3% to 5.7%. In sharp contrast, the percentage 
of low-income countries following intermediate regimes more than tripled during 
the sample period to stand at 63% in 2007. The choice of fixed and intermediate 
regimes of middle-income countries followed a similar pattern to low-income 
countries, although changes for middle-income countries were less dramatic.
However, very few middle-income countries (only 2.4% in 2007) allowed their 
currencies to float. The percentage of high-income countries following floating 
regimes remained relatively stable during the sample period. The percentages were 
7.7% and 6.1% in 1975 and 2007, respectively. However, in contrast to the two 
other groups of countries, the share of high-income countries following fixed 
regimes increased significantly, while the share for low-income countries following 
intermediate regimes dropped sharply.
This overview suggests that countries’ actual regime choices exhibit a large 
spectrum of fixed and intermediate regimes. Thus, contrary to Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995), fixed exchange rate regimes are not ‘mirages’. Floating regimes, on the 
other hand, appear to be a marginal category that reflects the ‘fear of floating’
behaviour first observed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). Figures 1 and 2 present the 
average values of the RR index over the years for all countries and different country 
6groups, respectively. The data in these figures also corroborate the fear of floating. 
Figure 1 shows that, on average, countries moved to more flexible regimes from the 
early 1970s. However, this trend seems to wane from the early 1990s. Similar trends 
can be observed for the country groups of low-income, middle-income and high-
income, separately (see Figure 2).
1.2 A brief historical overview of exchange rate regime choice
To shed a further light on the choice of exchange rate regimes and their evolution 
over the course of the last 150 years, a brief account of contemporary history of the 
International Monetary System (IMS) is useful. This overview is intended to show 
the reader the turning points in the understanding of exchange rate regimes. The said
period can be broadly classified into four distinct phases: classical gold standard 
(1870 to 1914), inter-war arrangements (1914 to 1945), Bretton Woods fixed-but-
adjustable exchange rate system (1946 to 1973) and Post–Bretton Woods floating 
era (1973 onwards). However, exchange rate regime during the early periods of IMS 
was relatively simple because there was only one dominant system from which to 
choose: fixed rate (Moosa 2005).7 Moreover, the choice was imperative mainly for 
‘core’ countries; ‘peripheral’ countries sought to follow the core in most cases 
(Bordo 2003).8
1.2.1 Classical Gold Standard: The Gold Standard, in essence, was a fixed 
exchange rate system under which each country expressed the value of its currency 
7 Those countries that failed to follow the dominant system (such as Austria-Hungary and 
Spain during gold standard periods) were viewed with disfavour (Bordo 2003). The failure 
to follow the dominant systems reflected these countries’ inability to do so, rather than a 
deliberate choice (Nurkse 1944).
8 The core countries were Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the US and some 
western European countries, while countries such as India, China and Austria-Hungary were 
considered peripheral (Bordo 2003).
7in terms of a fixed amount of gold, and the currency was fully convertible in gold.9
However, this convertibility could be suspended temporarily in the event of shocks,
such as wars or financial disturbances. Once the disturbances were over, the 
convertibility was restored at the pre-disturbance parity. This characteristic of the 
Gold Standard was termed ‘escape clause’, and contributed to the smooth operation 
of this regime (Eichengreen 1994, p 42).
The Gold Standard era began when Britain, the economic and political superpower 
of that time, officially adopted that regime in 1870. Gradually, all other core 
countries and many peripheral countries followed (Bordo 2003). Eventually, 
countries subscribing to the Gold Standard accounted for approximately 67% of the 
world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 70% of world trade (Chernyshoff, Jacks 
and Taylor 2009, p. 196).
It is believed that capital flow during the Gold Standard period was free and high,
which resulted in the automatic adjustment of balance of payments.10 Despite high 
capital mobility, exchange rate stability could be successfully maintained during the 
Gold Standard period. This period was also relatively successful in absorbing 
shocks. These were both possible due to a number of social and political factors (see 
Eichengreen and Sussman 2000, p. 22). First, output stabilisation and unemployment 
reduction were not issues, given that there was no generally established theory
relating monetary policy to the economic conditions. As such, these issues were 
subordinate to maintaining exchange rate stability. Second, because of low labour 
unionisation, nominal variables, such as wages and prices, were flexible downward.
In the event of internal and external shocks, this could adjust economies and 
9 When each country announced the value of its currency in terms of gold, the (fixed) 
exchange rate between two currencies could be obtained by cross-referencing.
10 This is known in the literature as ‘price-specie flow mechanism’.
8maintain stable exchange rates. The ‘escape clause’, as mentioned above, was also 
instrumental. At the beginning of World War I, gold convertibility was suspended. 
This suspension was ultimately not temporary because the war lasted longer than 
anticipated.
1.2.2 Inter-war arrangements: During World War I, countries following the Gold 
Standard system were forced to postpone the commitments of backing their 
currencies by gold (Eichengreen 2008). Instead, the countries issued ‘fiat-money’ to 
meet war expenses, which caused extensive fluctuations in their exchange rates
(Eichengreen 2008, p. 45). Nurkse (1944) observes that, after the war, countries 
attempted to return to the Gold Standard at pre-war gold parity, and in most cases at 
new parity. However, he maintains, concern among policy makers about the short 
supply of gold resulted in the adoption of a ‘gold exchange standard’, under which 
convertible foreign currency could be used alongside gold as reserves.
The gold exchange standard broke down at the end of the 1920s. This occurred 
because France, who accumulated huge surplus from the repatriation of capital and 
from the current balance of payments, decided to accept only gold in settlement of 
the surplus in 1928 (Nurkse 1944). This led Britain and other gold exchange 
standard countries to abandon gold parity, and allow their currencies to fluctuate 
(Nurkse 1944). He maintains that countries tried to control these fluctuations from 
time to time, which reflected their reservations about free-floating exchange rates, 
and their preference for exchange rate stability.
Though classical Gold Standard was relatively successful in maintaining a stable 
exchange rate and absorbing shocks, the inter-war monetary system was noted for its 
instability. This instability resulted from the fact that the economic and political 
circumstances that were conducive for pre-war stability—such as macroeconomic 
9flexibility and less concern for output stabilisation or unemployment reduction—
were not present during inter-war periods (Eichengreen 2008, p. 43).
1.2.3 The Bretton Woods system: The Bretton Woods system emerged from the
negotiations between Britain and the US at the end of the World War II. The 
objective of the negotiation was to set a monetary system that would be free from 
the instability of the inter-war period and would ensure stable exchange rates, 
national full employment policies and cooperation (Bordo 1993). To this end, the 
case for a ‘fixed-but-adjustable’ exchange rate was made, which would combine the 
favourable characteristics of the Gold Standard and flexible exchange rate 
systems—namely, exchange rate stability and monetary and fiscal independence, 
respectively (Bordo 1993).
Under this fixed-but-adjustable system, each country had to declare a fixed parity to 
the US dollar, which was, in turn, fixed to a certain amount of gold. However, the 
fixed parity could fluctuate within plus or minus 1% of the declared parity. The 
fixed parity of a country could be changed in the face of ‘fundamental 
disequilibrium’11 in a country’s balance of payments, and with IMF’s approval.
The BW fixed exchange rate system was different from the Gold Standard fixed 
system in a number of ways (see Eichengreen 2008, p. 91). First, the BW-period
fixed exchange rates were adjustable in the event of ‘fundamental disequilibrium’ in 
the balance of payments. Second, controls on international capital flows were 
permitted in order to avoid destabilising speculation. Third, a new institution, IMF, 
was formed to supervise national economic policies and help countries facing 
problems in their balance of payments.
11 This term was not defined in the IMF Articles of Agreement. Williamson (2009) defines 
this as an imbalance in payments that makes the cost of maintaining the existing parity very 
high.
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Bordo (1993), through reviewing historical data, states that overall macroeconomic 
performance during the BW era was superior to its predecessors of the Gold 
Standard and inter-war periods. However, the system had flaws that caused its 
demise in the early 1970s. Bordo (1993) gives the following three reasons for the 
collapse of the BW system. First, the gold parity of the dollar put the US under a
convertibility crisis, which led the US to adopt policies that made convertibility even 
harder. Second, the US monetary expansion policy caused worldwide inflation,
which was not appropriate for the system. Third, adjustable peg was un-workable 
under increasing capital mobility.
1.2.4 Post–Bretton Woods era: After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 
the early 1970s, a new IMS emerged, in which countries could freely choose their 
exchange rate arrangements. The result of this freedom of choice was that ‘the 
United States, Japan, Europe, and developing and emerging market economies 
embarked on different courses’ (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 2002, p 19). This ‘modern 
era’ continues to be the longest era in the history of IMS (Klein and Shambaugh 
2010).
This historical account of the IMS provides ample evidence of the role of capital 
mobility and financial development in the adoption of prevailing dominant exchange 
rate regimes and in the breakdown of regimes. To quote Bordo (2003, p. 32), ‘the 
dynamics of the international monetary system and the evolution of exchange rate 
regime is driven by financial development and international financial integration’.
Further, Bordo and Flandreau (2003) observe that, during the nineteenth century, 
core countries (more developed countries) preferred to fixed their exchange rates,
whereas the same developed countries have opted for a floating regime since the 
early 1970s. The case was more or less opposite for the peripheral (less developed) 
11
countries during these two periods, Bordo and Flandreau maintain. They argue that 
financial maturity was critical for a country to adhere to the Gold Standard, and the 
same is important to maintain a floating regime in the post-BW period. These 
observations point to the critical role played by financial development in exchange 
rate regime choice.
1.3 A brief account of the determinants and consequences of 
exchange rate regime choice 
A rich history of the exchange rate regime system spanning the last 150 years, as 
well as a wide spectrum of exchange rate regime choices in the post-BW era as 
shown above, have not gone unnoticed by academic researchers. The key point of 
investigation has been the factors affecting countries’ regime choices across fixed, 
floating and intermediate regimes. Considering that the exchange rate regime choice 
and its macroeconomic consequences are interrelated—‘they are flip sides of the 
same coin: a rational choice of the exchange rate regime presumably reflects the 
properties that the regime promises’ (Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 2002, p 23) - two 
strands of empirical literature have developed. One strand has examined the factors 
that affect regime choice, while the other has investigated the macroeconomic 
consequences of that choice. This section provides a concise review of the literature 
that investigates exchange rate regime choice and its macroeconomic consequences. 
This section also highlights some important gaps in the literature.
Since the late 1970s, empirical studies have identified a large number of economic, 
political, institutional, and historical factors as possible determinants of exchange 
rate regime choice. For example, Juhn and Mauro (2002) identify 30 such 
determinants. Motivated by optimum currency area (OCA) literature proposed by 
Mundell (1961), and extended by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), early
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empirical studies (e.g. Heller 1978) mainly examined the role of economic factors
such as trade openness, country size, economic development, capital mobility,
inflation and export concentration. Subsequent empirical studies examined the other
economic factors that include, but are not limited to, shocks, international reserves, 
GDP growth, current account balance, external debt, and remittance flows. The 
political, and institutional factors examined by empirical studies include: political 
instability, political freedom, interest groups, democracy, institutional quality,
central bank independence, and so on (for a list of these factors, see Juhn and Mauro
2002; Rizzo 1998; von Hagen and Zhou 2007; Carmignani, Colombo and Tirelli 
2008; Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Reggio 2010).12 Some common and robust 
determinants across the empirical studies are: country size, trade openness, shocks, 
economic development, political instability, and institutional quality.   
Some authors (e.g. Husain, Mody and Rogoff 2005; Klein and Shambaugh 2008; 
Rose 2012) argue that exchange rate regime choice can be persistent over time.
However, empirical studies invariably fail to document this persistence with formal 
econometric techniques. There is also an important theoretical linkage between the
health of the financial sector, the degree of capital account openness, and the 
exchange rate regimes (see Calvo and Mishkin 2003). However, a systematic and 
thorough treatment is yet to be undertaken for these factors given their demonstrated
role in recent financial crises in emerging market economies, particularly that in 
East Asia. Analogously, predicated on the idea that the real sector can impact on 
some central macroeconomic policy options, the role of product diversification has 
12 Here it should be mentioned that Exchange rate classifications categorising countries into 
different regimes over time are crucial for the analysis of the regime choice. Given the 
limitations of IMF de jure exchange rate classification, recent empirical studies have 
focused on ‘de facto’ or actual classifications. 
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been long acknowledged as a possible determinant of regime choice (see Kenen 
1969). However, the effects of this factor have not yet been investigated either 
directly or in conjunction with several other national indicators.
Regarding the macroeconomic consequences of exchange rate regime choice, Baxter 
and Stockman (1989) were the first to empirically examine the behaviour of 
macroeconomic outcomes, including industrial production, consumption, export and 
import, under different exchange rate regimes. However, Baxter and Stockman find
little systematic relationship between exchange rate regimes and those variables. 
Subsequent empirical studies use better exchange rate classification data and 
advanced econometric techniques, and examine the consequences of exchange rate 
regime choice on such variables as growth, growth volatility, shock absorption 
capacity, bilateral trade, and inflation. For instance, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003) investigate the growth effect of exchange rate regime choice and find that 
floating regime is associated with higher growth. However, this effect seems to be
more relevant for non-industrial countries. Output volatility is also found to be 
higher under fixed regimes (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2003; Ghosh, Gulde and 
Wolf 2002). Empirical studies further establish that flexible regime can act as a 
shock absorber in the event of terms-of-trade shocks (Edwards and Levy-Yeyati 
2005; Broda 2004) and world output and world real interest rate shocks (Hoffmann 
2007). There is also evidence that fixed exchange rates are conducive to higher 
bilateral trade (Klein and Shambaugh 2006; Frankel and Rose 2002) and lower 
inflation (Klein and Shambaugh 2010). 
Along this line, the issue of an exchange rate regime’s effect on fiscal discipline is 
important and timely, given the high and persistent budget deficits currently 
affecting many countries. There is a theoretical consensus, which dates back to 
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Keynes (1923), that exchange rate regimes can discipline fiscal policy. However, 
empirical studies that only examine the direct effect of regime choice on fiscal 
discipline cannot provide a definitive answer as to which exchange rate regime 
provides more fiscal discipline. The reason for this may be that these studies fail to 
account for the fact that exchange rate regime choice may interact with other 
theoretically important variables to affect fiscal discipline. This conjecture is 
justifiable, given that regime choice is a highly complicated issue. These gaps in 
empirical research must be properly addressed.
1.4 Thesis overview
This thesis consists of three essays that investigate the role of capital account 
openness, financial sector health and product diversification on de facto exchange 
rate regime choice, and the effect of the de facto choice on fiscal discipline during 
post-BW periods. In so doing, this thesis adopts RR de facto exchange rate 
classification with 14 categories and treats it as a continuous variable. Exchange rate 
classification data for the period from 1971 to 2007 are used. RR classification 
contains regime choice information for 178 countries, out of which 41 are low-
income countries, 88 are middle-income countries and 49 are high-income countries. 
Data for other relevant variables are obtained accordingly, based on availability. 
This thesis exploits a panel dataset that covers almost the entire post-BW period.
The first essay, entitled The Role of Capital Account Openness and Financial 
Development in Exchange Rate Regime Choice, examines how countries’ capital 
account openness, financial sector development and financial fragility affect their de 
facto exchange rate regime choice. Particular attention is given to the regime choice 
of different country groups—namely, low-income, middle-income and high-income 
countries. The major contribution of this essay is that it investigates the persistence 
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of regime choice, which previous studies have invariably ignored. In so doing, this 
essay uses system GMM technique. Fixed effect/random effect estimation technique 
has also been adopted for comparison purposes.
The important and robust finding of this essay is that regime choice is generally 
persistent over time. This suggests that a country’s regime choice for the previous 
period is a good predictor of regime choice for the current period. However, this 
persistence is particularly pronounced in low-income and high-income countries. 
Middle-income countries show very little persistence in their regime choice. This 
implies that middle-income countries change their regimes relatively often. This 
essay also finds robust evidence that higher capital account openness leads countries
towards more fixed regimes—particularly low-income and middle-income countries,
suggesting that countries prefer fixed regime induced exchange rate stability when 
their capital account openness becomes higher. There is also some evidence that 
financial sector development influences exchange rate regime choice. This leads 
countries towards flexible regimes in general; however, this effect is not always 
robust across different estimation techniques and country groups. There is little 
evidence that financial fragility, the other measure of financial sector health, affects 
regime choice.
The second essay An Empirical Inquiry into the Role of Product Diversification in 
Exchange Rate Regime Choice, focuses on one theoretically important determinant 
of regime choice: product diversification. The essay hypothesises that product 
diversification affects exchange rate regime choice both directly as well as through 
the real shock, financial sector development, and rent-seeking channels.
Considering the long-term nature of product diversification, this study is conducted 
in a cross sectional setting. The endogeneity of product diversification is tackled by 
16
instrumental variable (IV) and identification-through-heteroskedasticity technique 
proposed by Lewbel (2012). Neighbours’ size-weighted diversification is used as an 
IV for diversification. It is found that product diversification has a direct effect on
exchange rate regime choice. The effect is such that, as countries become more 
diversified, they tend to adopt flexible regimes. This finding is contrary to Kenen’s 
(1969) presumption that diversified economies are better candidates for fixed 
regimes. However, it supports the idea that more diversified countries experience 
lower output volatility, and thus, exhibit less fear of floating.
This essay also finds strong evidence that, in countries where the level of corruption 
is high, concentration leads to fixed regimes, as it may create more scope for rent-
seeking on the part of powerful elites. Diversification is also more likely to lead to 
flexible exchange rate regimes in developing countries with lower levels of financial 
development. There is also some evidence that diversification facilitates the 
adoption of flexible regimes in countries that are experiencing greater shocks.
The third essay Exchange Rate Regime and Fiscal Discipline: The Joint Role of 
Trade Openness and Central Bank Independence, investigates the consequences of 
exchange rate regime choice on fiscal discipline, given that previous studies 
examining the direct effect of regime choice offer inconclusive results as to which 
exchange rate regime provides more fiscal discipline. This essay states that an 
exchange rate regime can affect fiscal discipline directly and indirectly through its 
interaction with other variables. Specifically, this essay hypothesises that exchange 
rate regimes interact with trade openness and central bank independence (CBI) to 
jointly affect fiscal discipline.
This essay offers strong evidence that exchange rate regimes have a direct effect and 
an interaction effect with trade openness to influence fiscal discipline. Therefore, the 
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effect of regime choice on fiscal discipline critically depends on the levels of a
country’s trade openness. Estimated marginal effects show that, at low levels of 
trade openness, fixed regimes provide more fiscal discipline, while flexible regimes 
have more disciplinary effects at high levels of trade openness. This essay does not 
find any evidence that regime choice interacts with CBI to affect fiscal discipline. 
There is also little evidence that CBI has any direct effect on fiscal discipline. These 
findings are robust across different measures of fiscal outcomes, and are supported 
by several robustness checks.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Number of countries under different exchange rate regimes (IMF 
taxonomy)
Exchange rate regimes April 2009 April 2010 April 2011 
No separate legal tender 10 12 13
Currency board arrangements 13 13 12
Conventional peg arrangements 42 44 43
Stabilised arrangements 13 24 23
Crawling pegs 5 3 3
Crawl-like arrangements 1 2 12
Pegged exchange rates within crawling bands 4 2 1
Other managed arrangements 21 21 17
(Managed) floating 46 38 36
Free-floating 33 30 30
Total countries 188 189 190
Source: IMF Annual Reports, various years.
Note: IMF has been following this classification taxonomy since 2009. For previous taxonomies, see 
Habermeier et al. (2009).
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Table 2: List of Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) de facto exchange rate classifications 
Category Exchange Rate  Arrangements/Regimes 
1 No separate legal tender
2 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement
3 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
4 De facto peg
5 Pre announced crawling peg
6 Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
7 De facto crawling peg
8 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%
10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%
11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both 
appreciation and depreciation over time)
12 Managed floating
13
14
Freely floating
Freely Falling (Hyper float)
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Note: This classification is not directly comparable with IMF taxonomy in Table 1.
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Figure 1: Average values of RR index over time (all Countries)
Figure 2: Average values of RR index over time (Country Groups)
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Chapter 2: The Role of Capital Account Openness and 
Financial Development in Exchange Rate Regime Choice
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the choice of the exchange rate regime is crucial given its important
effects on key macroeconomic variables such as growth rate (Ghosh, Gulde and
Wolf 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2003), output volatility (Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger 2003), and inflation (Klein and Shambaugh 2010; Ghosh, Qureshi and
Tsangarides 2011). However, the determination of the exchange rate regime itself 
remains one of the least understood areas in international macroeconomics, despite a 
recent surge in research. One of the reasons for this lack of clear understanding is 
the presence of diverse de facto exchange rate arrangements across countries, as 
opposed to the theoretical classification of fixed versus floating regimes. Further, 
data on this detailed arrangement have been made available only recently. The 
econometric difficulty in incorporating many different choices into analysis in a 
tractable manner has led to a corpus of research to collapse them, which results in 
loss of information, or even failure to explain the true choice made by a country.
This study investigates two important determinants of exchange rate regime choice -
capital account openness and financial sector performance: both are firmly rooted in 
theoretical grounds. The linkages among the degree of capital account openness, 
health of the financial sector and exchange rate regime choice have come to 
forefront after the financial crises in emerging market economies, including those in 
the East Asian countries (Domac and Martinez Paria 2003). Further, the 
international community, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
pressures countries to move towards a greater exchange rate flexibility and liberalise 
international capital movements (Cooper 1999). The Independent Evaluation Office 
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of the IMF (2006, p 3) also observes that ‘since the Argentine crisis  the IMF has 
been seen by many as strongly favouring a flexible exchange rate underpinned by 
inflation targeting as the only viable regime under most circumstances’. However, in 
many instances, the IMF prescriptions are considered suspicious and 
counterproductive in the developing world.
Although there are some recent studies that investigate the role of capital account 
openness and financial development, this study departs from the extant literature in 
several distinct ways. First, it takes into account the persistence of exchange rate 
choice that previous studies have categorically ignored. It also exploits the most 
detailed 14 de facto exchange range arrangements compiled to date. A country does 
not frequently switch from fixed to floating exchange rate (or vice versa); rather, its 
actual regime lies in between. It also stays with a particular arrangement for quite 
some time before switching to another that may not be considerably different from 
the previous arrangement. Only a rich classification of exchange rate arrangements 
can account for this behaviour. Second, the study investigates the role of financial 
sector fragility, in addition to financial development, to capture the health of the 
financial sector that previous studies have ignored. It has now been recognised that 
financial development alone cannot account for the health of the financial sector 
(Loayza and Ranciere 2006). In addition, most studies investigating the determinants 
of exchange rate regime use the ratio of M2 to gross domestic product (GDP) as a 
proxy for financial development, which captures only the degree of monetisation in 
the financial system and ignores the degree of bank intermediation. We use credit 
disbursed to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions relative to 
GDP; an advantage of this proxy is that it excludes credit extended to the public 
sector and the funds provided from central or development banks. Finally, the role 
of capital account openness has not so far been investigated in a systematic way; 
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previous studies have included this variable in regressions as a control, ignoring its 
theoretical background.
There is a discrepancy between the de jure and de facto exchange rate regime
choices, referring, respectively, to the exchange rates announced by a country and 
the actual one it practices. The IMF classifies exchange rate regimes based on the 
announcement, but a country often deviates from its declared regime choice (Calvo 
and Reinhart 2002). In this study, we adopt the de facto exchange rate regime 
classification compiled by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), henceforth RR, who 
characterise countries in 14 ordered categories in terms of the actual exchange rate 
choices ranging from fully fixed to fully flexible. However, the presence of too 
many categories also poses econometric difficulty in estimating an ordered probit 
model; this becomes a near impossible task in the context of dynamic panel data. 
Nevertheless, 14 categories themselves enable treating the regime choice as 
continuous,13 facilitating estimation of a dynamic panel data model by the system 
GMM developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Data 
are averaged over five-year periods because the system GMM is appropriate for a 
large cross-section and a shorter time period; in our case this is also intended to test 
the exchange rate persistence in the medium-run. To address the heterogeneity 
among countries, we also estimate the model separately for countries, which, to a 
great extent, are homogenous in terms of income levels. We do this because 
developing, middle-income or developed countries encounter different 
13 This kind of treatment is quite common in empirical literature.  For example, Polity IV 
indicators or Freedom House political rights and civil liberties measures are often used as 
both the dependent variable, as well as the lagged dependent variable or explanatory 
variables on the right-hand side (see, Acemoglu et al. 2008; Bruckner and Ciccone 2011). 
Similarly, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) treat corruption index with seven categories as 
continuous dependent variable, and apply system GMM. On the other hand, Aghion et al. 
(2009) consider Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) classification as continuous and use it as an 
explanatory variable.
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macroeconomic problems that also influence their exchange rate choice. It is also 
highly likely that the persistence of exchange rate choice may differ by the level of 
development, especially because the middle-income or emerging countries have 
gone through more frequent changes than others in their exchange rate 
arrangements, thus exhibiting little persistence. We therefore estimate the model 
ignoring the persistence, which in turn allows us to compare our results with the 
existing literature.
Our results document that capital account openness is a significant determinant of 
exchange rate regime choice, leading countries towards more fixed regimes, 
especially for the low-income and middle-income countries. This result suggests that 
higher capital account openness and free-floating regime are not compatible for 
these groups of countries. The results also show that financial development leads 
towards floating regimes, but the result is not robust across specifications. By 
contrast, financial development leads to a fixed exchange regime for low-income 
countries, suggesting that a floating regime is not a viable option for such countries 
where the financial sector is underdeveloped. Financial sector fragility has no effect 
when all countries are considered together; however, it leads to a fixed exchange 
rate regime for low-income countries and a flexible regime for middle-income and 
high-income countries (although the latter results are not quite robust across 
specifications). Most importantly, we document a significant persistence of 
exchange rate regime choice for low-income and high-income countries, but almost 
no persistence for the middle-income countries, suggesting frequent changes in their 
exchange rate regime.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2.2 reviews the relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature and develops the motivation of the paper. Section 2.3 discusses 
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the data. Section 2.4 discusses the estimation strategy that includes system GMM, 
fixed and random effect models. Section 2.5 presents the results. Finally, section 2.6
provides a conclusion. All tables and figures are reported at the end of the paper.
2.2 Relevant literature and motivation
The literature on the optimum currency area (OCA), first discussed by Mundell 
(1961) and later extended by McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), links labour 
mobility, trade openness, country size and export diversification to exchange rate 
regime choice. Subsequent literature suggests other determinants, which include, 
among others, nominal and real shocks (Melvin 1985), political stability (Edwards 
1996) and institutional quality (Alesina and Wagner 2006).
Theoretical arguments also suggest that development of the financial sector and its 
stability and capital account openness are important determinants of regime choice. 
Adoption of a floating exchange rate requires a reasonably developed financial 
system, because exchange rate volatility is higher in countries with underdeveloped 
financial markets, which in turn imposes economic costs and makes floating costlier 
(Eichengreen 1994). This argument can be understood in the following way
(Eichengreen 1994, p 85):
a temporary disturbance that leads some investors to sell domestic-currency-
denominated assets will cause the exchange rate to plummet if liquidity constraints 
or other financial market imperfections prevent other investors from purchasing 
those assets in anticipation of a subsequent recovery in their value. The absence of 
forward markets similarly renders it difficult for firms and households to hedge 
exchange risk.
There is another strand of theoretical literature that stresses the role of financial 
sector fragility on regime choice in the light of financial crises in emerging market 
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economies. When bank deposits are denominated in local currency and a central 
bank serves as a lender of last resort, a flexible exchange rate can prevent a bank run 
or crisis (Chang and Velasco 2000). The implication of this argument is that 
countries with a fragile financial sector would be better off choosing a flexible 
exchange rate. Conversely, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999, p 6) purport that the 
‘moral hazard’ problem is commonplace to varying degrees in all financial systems, 
where  ‘banks are leveraged, banks have limited liabilities, markets have asymmetric 
information about the risk banks take, and banks are rescued with some probability 
when they get into trouble’. This moral hazard problem leads banks to take 
excessive risks, which is the main cause of financial fragility, Eichengreen and 
Hausmann maintains. They consider a pegged exchange rate as a source of moral 
hazard, in the sense that pegging is an implicit form of guarantee, which encourages 
unhedged short-term foreign-currency-denominated borrowing. The choice of 
exchange rate in this situation should be more flexible ones, which can limit short-
term capital inflows (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999).
The ‘bipolar’ view of exchange rate arrangements asserts that with increasing capital 
mobility countries should move towards either ends (hard peg or independent 
floating) of the exchange rate arrangements; intermediate regimes will disappear and 
floating will dominate between the two corner solutions (Eichengreen 1994; Fischer 
2001). This view has its origin in the ‘impossible trinity’ theorem of international 
economics, which states that a country cannot have exchange rate stability (a fixed 
exchange rate), perfect capital movement and independent monetary policy at the 
same time. Accordingly, given that capital is highly mobile, a country has to adopt a 
floating regime if it wants to exercise monetary policy for stabilisation purposes.
Frankel (1999, p 7), however, purports that countries can choose intermediate 
regimes even under perfect capital mobility, and achieve ‘half-stability and half-
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independence’. Conversely, Williamson (2000) argues that as capital is highly 
mobile only for industrial and emerging market countries, intermediate regimes can 
still be viable options for a large number of low income countries, which are 
effectively isolated from the international capital market.
Earlier empirical studies, such as Heller (1978), Dreyer (1978) and Holden, Holden 
and Suss (1979), test the role of the OCA factors that include trade openness, 
country size and export concentration, but these studies estimate cross-section 
specifications. Other cross-section studies go beyond the OCA criteria to examine 
the role of other determinants.14 Von Hagen and Zhou (2007) examine the role of a 
large number of determinants for about 100 developing countries using a panel 
dataset for the periods 1980 to 2000. They allow only three exchange rate choices—
fixed, intermediate and flexible—and estimate static and dynamic random effect 
multinomial panel models using a simulation-based technique. Among the large 
number of determinants, they find that OCA fundamentals (trade openness, 
geographical concentration of trade, country size and level of economic 
development), macroeconomic stabilisation considerations (inflation, relative price 
shock and domestic monetary shock) and currency crisis factors (international 
reserve adequacy, public finance performance and current account positions) are 
important determinants of regime choice. They also find that financial development, 
measured by the ratio of M2 to GDP, leads to a fixed regime, which is contrary to 
theory.
One common limitation of these studies is that they use the IMF de jure exchange 
rate classification, based on the announced regime choice by countries. However, 
the accuracy of de jure classification is now questioned (see Calvo and Reinhart 
14 For details, see Melvin (1985), Rizzo (1998), Juhn and Mauro (2002) and Poirson (2001). 
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2002) because of the significant difference between a country’s announced and 
actual regime choices. Considering the limitations of de jure exchange rate 
classification, subsequent studies use de facto classification. For example, Alesina 
and Wagner (2006) use RR de facto exchange rate classification; however, they 
choose a coarse classification of only five categories to investigate the role of 
institutional quality on exchange rate regime choices and estimate an ordered logit
model. Lin and Ye (2011) examine the role of financial development on de facto
regime choice using logit and survival analyses. They find that financial 
development increases the likelihood of shifting towards flexible regimes, although 
at the low level of financial development a country adopts a fixed regime. However, 
they estimate pooled regressions from the panel data without accounting for country 
specific heterogeneity and other associated time-invariant unobservables.
The above review demonstrates that previous studies employ either cross-section or 
pooled regressions and estimate a probit or logit model. Most importantly, these 
studies do not take into account the dynamics of the exchange rate choice. It is 
recognised that accounting the dynamics in discrete choice models is 
computationally challenging. This study overcomes this difficulty by using the RR 
14 category de facto exchange rate regime classification, which, as argued, can be 
treated as a continuous measure given the large spectrum over which it classifies the 
exchange rate regimes.
2.3 Data
We use a panel dataset for 145 countries for the period 1971 to 2007. The RR de 
facto exchange rate regime classification that we adopt ranges from one to 14, 
representing the most fixed and the most flexible regimes, respectively.15. Although 
15 A complete list of the classification is provided in Table 2 in Chapter 1.
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data for this classification are available from 1940 to 2007, this study uses data for 
the period 1971 to 2007 (Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff 2008), because data 
availability for most of the control variables starts from 1971 or later.16
Financial development is proxied by credit disbursed to the private sector by banks 
and other financial institutions relative to GDP. Following Loayza and Ranciere 
(2006), we use the standard deviation of growth rate of the ratio of private credit to 
GDP as the proxy for financial sector fragility. We use the measure of financial 
openness proposed by Chinn and Ito (2008) to proxy capital account openness. This 
is a de jure measure of capital account openness, which reflects the policy intentions 
of the countries. The index is normalised ranging from zero to one, where higher 
values indicate that countries are more open to cross-border transactions. A full list 
of the variables included in the analysis and their data sources are presented in 
Appendix A.1.
2.4 Estimation strategy
2.4.1 Model specification
Given the persistence in exchange rate choice, the dynamic panel model is the most 
appropriate estimation strategy. The persistence has also been interpreted as state 
dependence in exchange rate regime choice (Von Hagen and Zhou 2007). Hence, we 
estimate the following dynamic panel model:
ݕ௜௧ =  ߙ +  ߤ௜ +  ߣ௧ + ߜݕ௜,௧ିଵ +  ߚଵ ܥܣ ௜ܱ௧ +  ߚଶ ܲܥܴ௜௧ +  ߚଷ ܨܵܨ௜௧ +  ߠܺ௜௧
+  ߝ௜௧ … … . . (1)
16 Also, before the 1970s (during the Bretton Woods period), regime choice was very 
limited; countries were following some kinds of fixed regimes. After the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, countries began to choose different types of
exchange rate regimes. 
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where ݕ௜௧ is the exchange rate regime choice for country i in period (interval) t. ߤ௜ 
represents country fixed effects, ߣ௧ denotes time fixed effects, which are captured by 
time dummies, and the error term ߝ௜௧ is assumed not be correlated across countries. 
CAO, PCR and FSF are capital account openness, private credit and financial sector 
fragility, respectively.
The variables in the ࢄ௜௧ vector have been chosen based on economic theory and 
empirical literature discussed in section 2.2. The vector includes: i) openness 
measured as the share of export-import in GDP, ii) real shocks, iii) nominal shocks, 
iv) product concentration, v) inflation, vi) current account balance as a percentage of 
GDP, vii) quality of institution proxied by polity score (polity2) and viii) country 
size measured by (log) GDP.
The real shock is measured by the standard deviation of the terms of trade (TOT), 
while the nominal shock is measured by the average absolute deviation of the 
transformed growth rate of broad money (M2) from the three-year backward moving 
average (see, Von Hagen and Zhou 2007). Standard deviation measures the
volatility of a variable. We use a five-year period to calculate the volatility; annual 
data for all variables are averaged over five years accordingly. Five-year averaging 
gives seven time intervals: 1971 to 1975, 1976 to 1980, 1981 to 1985, 1986 to 1990, 
1991 to 1995, 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2007. However, data for the entire period 
are not available for many countries, so we estimate an unbalanced panel.
2.4.2 Estimation method
In estimating equation 1 we consider RR classification as a continuous variable 
which can be justified as follows. Countries choose a set of exchange rate 
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arrangements among a continuum of policy choices to comprise their exchange rate 
regimes. The de facto classification of Reinhart-Rogoff categorises this spectrum 
into 14 groups. If two countries differ only slightly in their exchange rate 
arrangements, they are likely to be allocated into the same group. To be allocated 
into different groups, they must have made sufficiently different policy choices. The 
question that arises here is whether these 14 groups should be treated as ordinal 
variables, or continuous variables rounded to integers. Even if one views these 
categories as ordinal, it seems that 14 different regimes make the underlying 
categorisation almost indistinguishable from a continuous measure.17 It is also 
important to mention that the five-year averaging of regime choice, which is a 
discrete variable, transforms it into a literally continuous variable. 18
We then estimate equation (1) by the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) system GMM method.19 This method assumes that there is no 
autocorrelation in the errors, ,i tH and requires the initial condition that the panel-
level effects, iP be uncorrelated with the first difference of the first observation of 
the dependent variable ( ,i ty ). We report the Arellano-Bond (1991) test statistic for 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced errors. The estimators are 
consistent only if the moment conditions are valid. We test the validity of the 
overidentifying moment conditions by the Sargan statistic. However, the asymptotic 
distribution of the Sargan statistic is unknown when the standard errors are corrected 
17 Monte Carlo simulations of Johnson and Creech (1983) demonstrate that grouping a 
continuous measure into finite number of categories is unlikely to create measurement error 
problem if the number of categories is greater than five. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 
(2004) find that cardinality vs ordinality assumptions regarding happiness scores make little 
difference to the results.
18 As shown in footnote 13, treating categorical variables as continuous dependent variables 
is quite common in empirical literature.
19 For a comprehensive discussion of the estimation of dynamic panel data, see Roodman 
(2009). 
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for heteroskedasticity. We therefore report the Sargan statistic by estimating the 
model without such correction. All variables except TOT volatility and polity are
treated as endogenous. The exogeneity of TOT volatility is also supported by 
empirical evidence (Mendoza 1995). It is also unlikely that a country’s exchange 
rate choice will affect its institutional development; other similar studies, such as 
Alesina and Wagner (2006), have also treated institutions as exogenous to exchange 
rates.
We also estimate the model by three country groups separately—low-income, 
middle-income and high-income—to understand how regime choice differs by the 
level of development. Countries also vary considerably in terms of capital account 
openness and financial development. Lastly, we also estimate our model ignoring 
the persistence of the exchange rate choice (excluding , 1i ty  in equation [1]). The 
reason is that persistence, although relevant for countries in general, may not be 
large enough for the middle-income countries. This conjecture is also supported by 
our empirical results in the next section. Further, this estimation will be helpful to 
compare our results with the previous literature. We estimate a fixed and random 
effect model depending on the Hausman test. To account for endogeneity, the first 
lag of all variables, except those of TOT volatility and polity, has been included in 
the regression.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Before turning to the estimation results, we present some descriptive statistics of 
main variables for the five-year averaged panel. First, the statistics for explanatory
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variables are presented by three exchange rate regime groups20 (fixed, intermediate 
and floating) (see, Table 1). It can be seen from the Table 1 that countries that 
follow fixed exchange rates have more open capital accounts on average. Financial 
development does not vary much by exchange rate regimes, but the financial sector 
is more fragile in countries with a floating regime (see Table 1). Then, the
descriptive statistics of dependent variable (RR index) and explanatory variables are 
presented by three country groups such as low-income, middle-income and high-
income countries in Table 2. Countries of different income groups are not much 
different in terms of their exchange rate arrangements (see Table 2). Capital account 
is more open in high-income countries, followed by middle-income countries. 
Again, high-income countries are more financially developed than other groups. 
Financial sector fragility is the highest in low-income countries and the lowest in 
high income countries. The descriptive statistics of the other explanatory variables 
also varies widely across different income groups.
2.5.2 Graphical analysis
In this section, we show relationships between exchange rate regime choices and 
three main explanatory variables—namely, capital account openness, financial 
development and financial fragility—with the aid of scatter graphs. In each case, we 
present the relationships for full samples and for three country groups categorised by 
income level.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between exchange rate regimes and capital account 
openness. Overall, the relationship is negative, which implies that higher capital 
account openness should lead countries towards fixed regimes (see Figure 1a). The 
20 The reason for aggregation is that descriptive statistics by 14 exchange rate categories are 
difficult to follow. The following is the aggregation from the 14 categories discussed in 
Table 2 in Chapter 1: fixed—1 to 4, intermediate—5 to 12 and floating—13 and 14.
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same relationship can be observed for three country groups as well (see Figure 1b to 
Figure 1d). However, the relationship seems to be somewhat weaker for high-
income countries.
Figure 2 documents the association between exchange rate regime choices and 
financial sector development, as measured by private sector credit to GDP. The 
overall positive relationship between these two variables reflects that countries adopt 
flexible regimes as they become more financially developed (see Figure 1a). 
However, this relationship varies widely across country groups. For instance, as can 
be seen from figures 1b to 1d, the positive relationship is pronounced for high-
income countries only. Interestingly, for low and middle-income countries the 
relationship is negative; that is, financial development in these countries is 
associated with fixed regimes.
The relationship between exchange rate regime choices and financial fragility also 
varies across country groups, as can be seen from Figure 3. Higher financial fragility 
leads to flexible regimes in low- and medium-income countries, but to fixed regimes 
in high-income countries.
2.5.3 Results for the dynamic panel estimation
In the following, we first present the results for the dynamic panel estimation. Our 
first specification includes only the three main variables—capital account openness, 
private credit and financial sector fragility. The second specification includes two
OCA variables, such as trade openness, and country size. The final specification 
adds product concentration, institutional quality and factors related to 
macroeconomic and currency crisis, such as institution, both real and nominal 
shocks, inflation and current account balance. The sample size reduces in the full 
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specification because of the lack of data for product concentration, institution and 
TOT volatility for several countries, so we also estimate another specification 
excluding these three variables to take advantage of a larger sample.
The results for all countries are reported in Table 3. In our first two specifications, 
the AR(2) test does not pass the suggested criteria. In the following, we report only 
the results in which both AR(2) and Sargan tests are valid. The results for the 
specification with all controls (see column 3) show that capital account openness has 
a significant negative coefficient, suggesting that more open capital account leads to 
fixed exchange rate regimes. Conversely, financial development leads to more 
flexible exchange rate, as indicated by its positive and significant coefficient. 
Financial fragility has been found to have no effect. Among other controls, only 
nominal shock has a significant effect, and it leads a country to choose more flexible 
exchange rates. In our final specification with fewer controls, but with a larger 
number of countries, only capital account openness remains significant (see column 
4). It is important to note that in all specifications the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is large, ranging between 0.5 and 0.8, and significant at any 
conventional level.
We now estimate the model separately for three country groups—low-income,
medium-income and high-income. The results are presented in Table 4. For low-
income countries, the results for the specification with all controls show that capital 
account openness leads to fixed exchange rates, while greater financial development, 
unlike in the full sample, leads to fixed exchange rates (see column 1). A country 
with financial fragility opts for fixed exchange rates. Among other determinants, 
product concentration is related to fixed exchange rates and nominal shocks lead to 
flexible exchange rates. Country size also leads low-income countries to flexible 
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regimes. However, only financial fragility and country size continue to be 
significant in the larger sample with higher number of countries (see column 2). In 
both specifications, coefficients of lag dependent variables are quite high (0.6 and 
0.7, respectively), and highly significant, which suggests the persistence of exchange 
rate regime choices for low-income countries. The results for the middle-income
countries are reported in column 3. However, the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is insignificant and its magnitude is very low at less than 0.2. This suggests 
that a dynamic panel model is not appropriate for this group of countries. This 
implies that persistence in exchange rate regimes is insignificant, indicating middle-
income countries change their exchange rate arrangements more frequently than 
low-income and high-income countries. The results for the high-income countries 
are presented in columns 4 to 5. In the specification with all controls, none of the 
determinants is significant. However, there are only 13 countries in this 
specification. When the above three variables are excluded, the number of countries 
increases to 26. Contrary to the low-income countries, both financial development 
and its fragility lead to greater exchange rate flexibility, and capital account 
openness has no significant effect. However, regime choice for this group of 
countries is also highly persistent, as can be seen from the large and significant 
coefficient of lag dependent variables.
Although we treat the exchange rate arrangements as continuous, it is difficult to 
give a quantitative interpretation of the results, because marginal change from one 
arrangement to another qualitatively differs across different arrangements. However, 
we can interpret the results by calculating beta coefficient which is -0.13 for capital 
account openness in column 4 of Table 3. To interpret it, we take the case of Brazil.  
During 2001 to 2007 periods, Brazil’s regime choice was at the flexible end of RR 
classification index, and its average capital account openness was roughly equal to 
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the mean value of the capital account openness index (0.41). Then, according to our 
model, one standard deviation increase in the Brazil’s capital account openness will 
bring the country’s regime choice next to Chile or Columbia. Similarly, South 
Africa was a free-floater and had a relatively closed capital account (at 25% 
percentile value) on an average during 2001 to 2007. Our model predicts that one
standard deviation increase in the capital account openness should bring South 
Africa’s regime choice at Thailand or Mexico’s level. 
2.5.4 Results for the fixed or random effect estimation
Although we have found significant persistence in the choice of exchange rate 
regimes, we now estimate the model by ignoring the dynamics for the following 
reasons. First, persistence of the exchange rate regime varies across country groups; 
as documented above, it is indeed not persistent for the middle-income countries. 
Second, this investigation helps understand whether an inclusion of dynamics in the 
exchange rate choice model influences the significance of other determinants. 
Finally, this allows us to compare our results with the literature. We estimate the 
model by fixed or random effects depending on the Hausman test. Our estimation 
still departs from others in the literature in terms of using both panel data and 
disaggregated classification of exchange rate regimes.
The results for all countries are reported in Table 5. We estimate the same 
specifications as in previous section. The results indicate that capital account 
openness leads to fixed exchange rate choices, as in the dynamic model. The 
magnitude of the coefficient is smaller in both full and reduced samples (columns 1 
and 2, respectively) compared to those in the dynamic panel estimations. Financial 
development leads to more flexible exchange rate regimes, but financial fragility has 
no effect; these results are in line with the previous results. However, in contrast to a 
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dynamic panel model, we find that TOT volatility and better institution leads a 
country to more flexible exchange rates. Large countries also opt for more flexible 
exchange rates.
However, as in the dynamic panel model, results vary across countries of different 
income levels, evident in Table 6. For example, capital account openness contributes 
to fixed exchange rates only for middle-income countries; financial development 
contributes to flexible exchange rates only for high-income countries. Nominal 
shocks lead a country to choose fixed exchange rates for the high-income countries.
A low-income country experiencing high inflation would choose fixed exchange 
rates, which establishes the role of a fixed exchange rate regime as a nominal anchor 
to inflation.
We also find some contrasting results in the two different estimation methods, which 
are due to the failure of incorporating the dynamics in exchange rate choices.
2.6 Conclusion
Determination of exchange rate regimes remains to be one of the least understood 
areas in international macroeconomics, despite a recent surge in research in the area. 
A number of studies consider different factors, but overlook capital account 
openness and financial sector development and fragility. This paper investigates the 
role of current account openness and overall performance of the financial sector in
exchange change regime determination in a dynamic panel framework, accounting 
for the dynamic persistence of the exchange rate choice. Adopting a detailed 
classification of 14 de facto exchange rate arrangements, estimations are carried out 
across low-income, middle-income and high-income country groups. These features 
distinguish this paper from the extant literature.
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One important contribution of this paper is to uncover significant persistence in 
exchange rate choice over time. However, the persistence varies considerably across 
different country groups. Exchange rate regime choice appears to be quite persistent
for low- and high-income countries. Middle-income countries do not exhibit any 
persistence at all, pointing to frequent changes from one exchange rate arrangement 
to another. Once this persistence is controlled for, capital account openness is 
documented to be leading countries towards more fixed regimes. This effect is 
especially pronounced for the low-income and middle-income countries. Financial
development leads towards floating regimes in general, but to fixed exchange 
regimes for low-income countries. The latter result suggests that floating is not a 
viable option for low-income countries with an underdeveloped financial sector. 
Financial sector fragility is found to have no effect when all countries are considered 
together; however, there are some evidences that it leads to fixed exchange rate 
regimes for low-income countries and flexible regimes for middle- and high-income 
countries. The latter finding is not robust across different estimation methods. We 
also document that failure to account for the persistence in exchange rate choices 
may lead to misleading results, especially in relation to the effect of TOT volatility 
and institutional quality.
Future research in this area would benefit from exploring how exchange rate regime 
choice can be determined in a non-linear fashion, given that the effects of some 
determinants on the choice may depend critically on the levels of other theoretically
important variable(s).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables under different 
exchange rate regimes
Variables Fixed Regimes Intermediate
Regimes
Floating Regimes
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Capital account openness 0.49 0.35 0.42 0.33 0.34 0.35
Financial development 0.44 0.38 0.42 0.35 0.46 0.51
Financial fragility 10.60 10.82 9.42 9.20 19.04 56.51
openness 94.52 52.95 78.35 54.28 52.87 36.17
Level of development 8.58 1.17 8.67 1.037 8.58 1.16
GDP (log) 22.17 2.50 23.51 1.96 24.10 2.62
Product concentration 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.07
Real shock 8.31 10.63 7.22 10.63 11.13 13.41
Nominal shock 0.42 2.27 0.10 2.28 0.45 2.66
Polity2 0.17 7.50 2.56 6.91 2.44 6.52
Inflation 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.30 0.24
Current account balance -4.90 11.79 -2.81 9.56 -3.90 5.59
Note: The following is the aggregation of exchange rate regimes from the 14 categories listed in 
Table 2 in chapter 1: fixed – 1 to 4, intermediate – 5 to 12, and floating – 13 to 14.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of dependent variable and explanatory variables
by different country Groups
Variables Low-income
countries
Middle-income
countries
High-income
countries
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Regime choice 6.84 4.31 6.87 4.21 6.27 4.01
Capital account openness 0.25 0.23 0.38 0.32 0.68 0.34
Financial development 0.14 0.09 0.32 0.24 0.75 0.42
Financial fragility 13.08 8.11 12.98 27.99 6.88 8.92
openness 61.49 34.48 85.15 43.60 89.48 67.17
Level of development 7.20 0.526 8.47 0.665 9.89 .621
GDP (log) 21.63 1.39 22.32 2.39 24.42 2.49
Product concentration 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.05
Real shock 13.14 15.88 7.98 8.05 4.06 5.80
Nominal shock 0458 2921 0.14 0.44 0.13 0.33
Polity2 -2.56 5.18 0.583 7.01 5.12 7.69
Inflation 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.06
Current account balance -6.30 7.97 -4.46 9.05 -.359 12.39
Note: Countries are grouped based on World Bank classification.
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Table 3: Determinants of exchange rate choice: dynamic panel estimation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent variable 0.818*** 0.797*** 0.511*** 0.755***
(0.087) (0.076) (0.132) (0.079)
Capital account openness -1.269* -1.681** -3.438** -1.580*
(0.694) (0.772) (1.398) (0.908)
Financial development 0.730 0.680 2.711*** 0.669
(0.722) (0.738) (0.924) (0.671)
Financial fragility -0.038 -0.019 -0.017 -0.036
(0.037) (0.025) (0.036) (0.029)
Openness -0.004 -0.005 -0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
GDP (log) 0.048 0.230 0.267
(0.223) (0.311) (0.191)
Product concentration 3.005
(4.364)
Inflation 4.147 0.370
(3.360) (1.951)
Nominal shock 0.191** 0.052
(0.078) (0.049)
Current account balance 0.030 0.004
(0.043) (0.017)
Polity2 0.080
(0.059)
Real shock 2.498
(3.917)
Constant 2.557*** 1.900 -2.489 -2.937
(0.875) (5.480) (8.135) (4.537)
Number of observations 630 617 206 528
Number of countries 136 133 68 119
Number of instruments 46 66 76 96
p-value of the AR(2) 
coefficient 
0.04 0.04 0.16 0.15
p-value of Sargan statistics 0.33 0.14 0.30 0.55
Note: Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond (1991) robust standard errors. ***, ** and * are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain time dummies, but they are 
not reported.
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Table 4: Determinants of exchange rate choice: dynamic panel estimation by 
country income group
Low-income Middle-income High-income
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag dependent variable 0.617*** 0.710*** 0.180 0.608*** 0.792***
(0.116) (0.091) (0.114) (0.172) (0.089)
Capital account openness -3.756** 0.253 -3.163*** 1.412 0.453
(1.790) (1.363) (1.211) (1.424) (1.002)
Financial development -7.655* -2.725 3.585*** 0.750 1.701*
(4.176) (3.031) (1.073) (1.158) (0.916)
Financial fragility -0.146*** -0.065* -0.011 0.096 0.025**
(0.045) (0.036) (0.026) (0.059) (0.013)
Openness 0.001 -0.013 -0.021* 0.002 -0.000
(0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005)
GDP (log) 0.381* 0.506** 0.037 0.356 0.333
(0.207) (0.228) (0.448) (0.430) (0.241)
Product concentration -10.552*** 8.050** -8.341
(3.535) (3.403) (6.411)
Inflation 1.741 8.697 10.018*** 2.629 0.898
(8.309) (7.911) (2.903) (2.350) (1.882)
Nominal shock 0.084** 0.014 -0.101 -1.379 0.318
(0.038) (0.058) (0.720) (1.063) (0.611)
Current account balance -0.034 0.001 0.024 -0.048 -0.017**
(0.076) (0.042) (0.041) (0.038) (0.009)
Polity2 0.037 0.163*** -0.050
(0.138) (0.055) (0.044)
Real shock 3.995 3.980 3.572
(2.812) (3.792) (4.625)
Constant -2.263 -8.250 3.774 -6.157 -7.411
(5.714) (5.815) (12.055) (10.905) (5.632)
Number of observations 44 126 118 44 118
Number of countries 18 30 37 13 26
Number of instruments 66 96 76 72 96
p-value of the AR(2) 
coefficient 
0.15 0.61 0.17 0.55 0.82
p-value of Sargan statistics 0.98 0.90 0.28 0.97 0.44
Note: Figures in the parentheses are Arellano-Bond (1991) robust standard errors. ***, ** and * are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. All equations contain time dummies, but they are not 
reported. For middle-income countries regression results for full model are not reported because 
AR(2) and Sargan tests are not valid for the full model.
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Table 5: Determinants of exchange rate choice: random effect estimation
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital account openness -2.869*** -2.868*** -1.987** -1.617**
(0.716) (0.700) (0.931) (0.717)
Financial development 1.525* 1.229 2.800*** 1.894**
(0.924) (0.890) (0.909) (0.965)
Financial fragility -0.000 0.003 0.028 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010)
Openness -0.012 -0.009 -0.012
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
GDP (log) 0.581*** 0.581** 0.626***
(0.140) (0.261) (0.162)
Real shock 5.734***
(1.992)
Nominal shock 0.125*** 0.006
(0.027) (0.063)
Product concentration -0.584
(3.090)
Inflation -3.067 -0.259
(2.365) (1.585)
Current account balance -0.035 0.019
(0.026) (0.014)
Polity2 0.068*
(0.038)
Constant 7.205*** -5.847 -6.831 -7.186*
(0.494) (3.694) (6.723) (4.161)
Number of observations 592 578 258 488
Number of countries 145 142 74 127
p-value of Hausman statistic 0.33 0.78 0.11 0.57
Note: Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) robust standard errors. ***, ** and * are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. All equations contain time dummies, but they are 
not reported.
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Table 6: Determinants of exchange rate choice: random (fixed) effect 
estimation by country income group
Low-income Middle-income High-income
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (6)
RE RE RE RE FE RE
Capital account openness -0.698 1.375* -2.786** -2.813*** -0.264 0.800
(1.869) (0.819) (1.175) (0.929) (1.182) (1.324)
Financial development -0.340 -4.203 2.659* 2.226 2.368* 2.330*
(8.938) (3.436) (1.550) (1.454) (1.255) (1.315)
Financial fragility -0.013 -0.021 0.042*** 0.018 0.154** 0.028
(0.055) (0.042) (0.014) (0.011) (0.059) (0.031)
Openness 0.009 -0.030 -0.019 -0.019** 0.051* 0.003
(0.035) (0.023) (0.014) (0.009) (0.028) (0.008)
GDP (log) 0.660 1.092** 0.688* 0.571*** 0.445 0.673*
(0.806) (0.531) (0.408) (0.212) (1.630) (0.357)
Real shock -3.270 4.731* 13.406*
(5.763) (2.606) (6.659)
Nominal shock 0.171*** 0.033 0.291 0.362 -3.019*** -1.354**
(0.049) (0.065) (0.443) (0.410) (0.494) (0.544)
Product concentration -6.268 3.322 0.975
(9.862) (2.271) (5.035)
Inflation 12.669*** 7.369** -5.464* -1.798 -2.608 -2.377
(4.751) (2.988) (3.014) (2.091) (1.873) (2.415)
Current account balance 0.036 0.086 -0.029 0.025 -0.021 0.015
(0.072) (0.064) (0.031) (0.035) (0.044) (0.019)
Polity2 0.032 0.119** 0.091
(0.112) (0.047) (0.083)
Constant -7.715 -16.779 -9.396 -4.773 -8.064 -11.849
(19.207) (13.181) (10.575) (5.358) (42.156) (8.661)
56 118 147 260 55 110
Number of observations 20 33 40 68 14 26
Number of countries 0.31 0.13 0.30 0.39 0.01 0.32
Note: Figures in the parentheses are White (1980) robust standard errors. ***, ** and * are 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. RE denotes random effect while FE denotes fixed 
effect estimation. All equations contain time dummies, but they are not reported.
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Figures
Figure 1: Exchange rate regime choice and capital account openness
1a: All countries
1b: Low-income countries
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Figure 2: Exchange rate regime choice and financial development
1a: All countries
1b: Low-income countries
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Figure 3: Exchange rate regime choice and financial fragility
1a: All countries
1b: Low-income countries
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Appendix A.1: Variable descriptions and data sources
Variables Description Data source Data period
Regime choice 
(dependent 
variable)
Exchange rate regime choice, 
Reinhart-Rogoff ‘fine’ 
classification 
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) and Ilzetzki, 
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008)
1971–2007
Financial sector 
development
Private sector credit to GDP in 
decimal 
Beck and Demirgüç-
Kunt, 2009
1971–2007
Financial fragility Standard deviation of the growth 
rate of private credit
Beck and Demirgüç-
Kunt, 2009
1971–2007
Capital account 
openness (CAO)
A CAO index, which takes values 
between 0 to 1 
Chinn and Ito (2008) 1971–2007
Openness The sum of export and import of 
goods and services as percentage of 
GDP 
Pen World Table 
version 6.3
1971–2007
Size of the 
economy
Log of GDP United Nations Statistics 
Division
1971–2007
Level of 
development
Log of per capita GDP in USD Pen World Table
version 6.3
1971–2007
Product 
concentration 
Herfindahl index, which takes 
values between 0 to 1 
UNCTAD 1971–2000
Real shock Standard deviation of the terms of 
trade 
WDI 1980–2007
Nominal Shock Average absolute deviation of the 
transformed growth rate of broad 
money (M2) from the three-year 
backward moving average 
WDI 1971–2007
Polity2 A Polity index (-10 to 10), proxy 
for institutional quality
Polity IV Database 1971–2007
Inflation Transformed CPI inflation. 
Transformation formula: 
((inflation/(1+inflation)) 
WDI 1971–2007
Current account 
balance
Current account balance as 
percentage of GDP (proxy for
currency crisis factors)
WDI 1971–2007
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Chapter 3: An Empirical Inquiry into the Role of Product 
Diversification in Exchange Rate Regime Choice
3.1 Introduction 
There is a considerable debate over what determines exchange rate regime choices. A 
corpus of literature has come up with no single theory or empirical model that 
encapsulates all of the possible determinants of exchange rate policies. Given that the
factor(s) which play the most significant role in the choice of a regime are not known a
priori, studies have utilised a myriad of variables in their quest for the determinants 
(see, inter alia, Juhn and Mauro 2002, Von Hagen and Zhou 2007, and Carmignani, 
Colombo and Tirelli 2008, for a list).  
This study focuses on product diversification as one of the key determinants of
exchange rate regimes. The core idea behind this paper is that production patterns in the
real sector are likely to shape some central macroeconomic policy choices, such as 
exchange rate arrangements. Despite this intuitive point, the role of product 
diversification in exchange rate regime determination has, surprisingly, not been 
subjected to any empirical scrutiny. Our principal objective is to fill this gap.21 Also, as 
is foreshadowed in the theoretical discussions below, product diversification may affect 
the exchange rate regime not only directly, but also through a combination of several 
factors. This line of reasoning leads us to explore the interactions between 
diversification and shock absorption, financial market development, and rent-seeking. 
Exploring these factors, then, enables us to investigate the “mechanisms” through which 
they affect the exchange rate regimes. This approach is in contrast to the extant
21 Trade diversification has been considered in the literature for exploring different questions 
(see Michaely 1958, Holden, Holden, and Suss 1979, Savvides 1990).
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empirical work, which assumes that the exchange rate regime is determined in a linear 
fashion, i.e., only through a direct effect, by the hypothesised variable(s).
Going back to our core idea, patterns in the real economy, and the policy impacts 
thereof, can be investigated through product (or sectoral) diversification.22 This is 
helped by the definition of diversification, which refers to the economy’s engagement in 
production activities in various sectors, instead of concentrating on only a few. Often 
measured using metrics which capture the relative disparities among sectoral shares, 
diversification has been shown, in an influential paper by Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), to 
be non-monotonically related to the level of development. That is, economies initially 
experience rising levels of diversification, then tend to re-concentrate after reaching a
certain level of income. This curious finding suggests that concentration follows a U-
shaped pattern with respect to per capita income (see also Koren and Tenreyro 2007).
Another important feature of the concept of diversification is that it is at the centre of 
one of the longest-standing debates in the economics literature. On the one hand, 
several economic theories, such as the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin theories of 
international trade, promote specialization, in order to reap the benefits of comparative 
advantage and productivity gains.  On the other hand, a number of studies, motivated by 
a “portfolio” approach, emphasize the importance of diversification highlighting the 
risks associated with specialization, and favouring diversification over specialization. 
For instance, Burns (1960) considers the sectoral composition of the economy as one of 
predictors of output volatility, because some activities, such as agriculture, tend to be 
riskier than others, like services. Thus, product diversification is seen as a means of
22 On a terminology-related note, we refer to both sectoral diversification and concentration in 
this paper, with the latter being the inverse of diversification, i.e., a lack of diversification. 
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spreading production risks over a number of activities, and as a recipe for output 
volatility and employment fluctuations (see Imbs and Wacziarg 2003, and Kenen 
1969).23
As the discussion above also hints, the importance of product diversification as one of 
the key factors in exchange rate regime determination has been acknowledged in the 
context of its shock absorbing role in the economy. For instance, the output cost of 
exchange rate volatility, as discussed by Lahiri and Végh (2001), can be mitigated 
through diversification because a diversified economy is characterized by less volatile 
terms of trade and real exchange rates. On the other hand, Kenen (1969), one of the 
early studies of optimum currency areas (OCA), argues that product diversification 
enables countries to adopt fixed regimes because it ensures a stable external sector and 
terms of trade, and thus obviates the need for frequent changes in nominal exchange 
rates. Despite having been observed in principle, this shock absorption effect has not yet 
been put to an explicit empirical test. Furthermore, other possible mechanisms through 
which product diversification may affect regime choice have been overlooked
categorically, both theoretically and empirically. This paper identifies the financial 
development and rent-seeking channels as possible mechanisms behind exchange rate 
regime determination, in addition to the shock absorption channel. The idea here is that 
shock absorption, financial market development, and rent-seeking may, clearly, have 
their own independent effects on exchange rate regime choice (see, for instance, Von 
23 Cameron (1978), on the other hand, shows some ways in which industrial concentration can 
be risk-reducing.  He argues that a high industrial concentration (i.e., a larger share of 
production and employment in a few firms) facilitates higher unionization and provides a wider 
scope for collective bargaining. This creates stronger labour confederations, ensuring larger 
income supplements in the form of social security schemes, health insurance, unemployment 
benefits, job training, and employment subsidies from the government. These income 
supplements help to mitigate the external risks.  
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Hagen and Zhou 2007; Alesina and Wagner 2006; and Lin and Ye 2011); however, 
depending on their levels, they may also facilitate or inhibit the impact of
diversification, and/or may differ in their degree of influence at different levels of
diversification. The direct effect of product diversification, on the other hand, does not 
depend on any of the three interaction variables above, but can still exert a significant 
direct impact on the choice of exchange rate regime. We provide theoretical 
underpinnings for the three mechanisms identified and the direct effect by drawing on 
several studies. Thus, taken together, this study fills two major gaps in the literature. 
First, it provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of product diversification 
on the de facto exchange rate regime choice; and, second, it explores whether the 
exchange rate regimes are shaped by a direct effect and/or (an) interaction effect(s) with 
real shock absorption, financial development, and rent-seeking, associated with 
diversification. The paper runs a ‘horse race’ among the three identified factors and the 
direct effect in order to evaluate their relative levels of importance. In summary, the 
main contribution of this study is to shed a unique light on the way in which changing 
production patterns in the real sector shape a core factor in macroeconomic policy,
namely exchange rate regimes.
Our empirical analysis uses a cross sectional dataset covering 125 countries over the 
period 1971–2000. We adopt Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) de facto24 exchange rate 
regime classification, which ranges from 1 to 14, representing the most fixed and the 
most flexible regimes, respectively. The Herfindahl index, a commonly used metric of 
24 The IMF classification of exchange rate regimes, which is based on member countries’ 
announcements, is termed the de jure classification. However, countries often deviate from their 
announced behaviour (see Calvo and Reinhart 2002), which gives rise to the de facto
classification, reflecting the actual behaviour of exchange rates.   
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concentration, is utilised for measuring product diversification. An investigation based 
on a five-year averaged pooled panel has also been conducted. Instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation, together with ‘identification through heteroskedasticity’, as proposed 
by Lewbel (2012), is used to tackle possible endogeneity due to reverse causation from 
regime choice to product diversification. In drawing empirical inferences, we rely 
primarily on marginal effects of the interaction terms rather than on point estimates; 
these are illustrated graphically, portraying the portion of the constituent variable over 
which the effect is statistically significant.
Our findings are very insightful. Product diversification has a direct, robust and 
significant effect on regime choice, leading to flexible regimes. The rent-seeking 
channel is robustly significant, with the result that, in countries with higher corruption 
levels, sectoral concentration (or lower diversification) leads to fixed regimes, which 
may provide more scope for rent-seeking among the powerful elites. The financial 
development channel is also critical, as diversified economies will choose flexible 
regimes, conditional on the level of financial development. However, this effect is 
significant only for developing countries with relatively less developed financial 
markets. Finally, diversification facilitates the adoption of flexible regimes in countries 
which are experiencing greater shocks, a finding which is in contrast to Kenen’s (1969) 
prediction. All of these results hold even after several variables and country-fixed 
factors have been controlled for. Our main conclusions in relation to the marginal effect 
of diversification on regime choice are generally consistent across the different 
identification methods and the cross-sectional and panel datasets. In summary, this 
study finds that product diversification is a critical component of exchange rate 
determination, leading to flexible regimes in developing countries which are facing 
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higher levels of real shock, and where financial development is low and corruption is 
relatively high.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the possible links 
between the regime choice and diversification. Section 3.3 describes the data, and 
Section 3.4 the methodology. Section 3.5 presents the estimation results. Some 
conclusions are drawn in Section 3.6. All tables and figures are reported at the end of 
the paper
3. 2 Theoretical underpinnings 
The direct effect of diversification on exchange rate regime choice is not well-
documented in the literature. Lahiri and Végh (2001) argue that the output costs of 
exchange rate fluctuations explain the stylised facts about the exchange rate behaviour
well. This sheds light on the reluctance of most countries to float their exchange rates, 
which is termed the “fear of floating” by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). Along these lines, 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) argue that this “fear of floating” is actually a
“fear of appreciation”, which can be attributed to the ‘Dutch disease’ phenomenon, i.e.,
loss of competitiveness and serious setbacks to export diversification (Reinhart 2000).
The output costs due to excessive swings in the exchange rate under floating regimes 
can be stabilised by diversified domestic and the external sectors, given that the terms 
of trade and real exchange rate are less volatile in such economies. Thus, one can
hypothesise that product diversification would reduce the fear of floating, and therefore 
lead to more flexible exchange rate regimes.   
65
3.2.1 Real external shocks, diversification, and exchange rate regime choice 
The direct effect of external shocks on the exchange rate regime should lead to flexible 
exchange rate regimes, given that such regimes would insulate the economy against 
negative consequences. This follows from the automatic stabilizer role of flexible 
exchange rates in the event of a real shock (Friedman 1953). When domestic prices are 
sticky, a negative real shock (say, a deterioration in the terms of trade) leads to a 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which in turn reduces the relative price of 
tradable goods. Therefore, the negative effect of the shock is partially offset by the 
resulting fall in the price of tradable goods (Broda, 2001).25
The interaction effect between diversification and shocks follows from the shock 
absorbing role of diversification, which protects an economy from excessive 
volatility.26 An example of the shock absorbing role of diversification is given by 
Kenen (1969), who argues that a well-diversified economy will not have to undergo 
frequent changes in its terms of trade, because product diversification is likely to be 
reflected in export diversification, which keeps a country’s aggregate exports relatively 
stable. This is unlikely in a concentrated economy, because sector-specific external 
shocks will not be averaged out. Therefore, a well-diversified economy is more capable 
of adopting a fixed exchange rate regime. Also, Corden (2002) argues that the costs of 
25 The insulation property of flexible exchange rate regimes has been established empirically by 
Broda (2001), Broda (2004), Hoffmann (2007) and Ramcharan (2007). Broda (2004), using a 
panel VAR, finds that, in the event of terms-of-trade shocks, the adjustment to the economy is 
better under a flexible exchange rate regime. Hoffmann (2007) extends this analysis to an 
examination of whether this better adjustment capacity of flexible regimes can be established 
for other kinds of external shocks, such as world output and world interest rate shocks.                
26 Ramcharan (2005) empirically examines the effectiveness of diversification for mitigating the 
costs of shocks.  He measures the cost of shocks as the impact of earthquake shocks on a 
country’s consumption. Using a panel of 39 countries over the period 1971–2001, he finds that 
sectoral specialization greatly magnifies the cost of shocks.
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abandoning independent monetary and exchange rate policies are likely to be lower in a 
diversified economy because of the relative stability of the terms of trade and real 
exchange rates.27
All of these studies suggest that the direct effect of real shocks which leads to the 
adoption of flexible regimes is weakened by the presence of a concentrated economic 
structure, resulting in a lack of insulation for the real economy. Similarly, the ‘fear of 
floating’ effect associated with concentration is magnified in economies which are 
facing higher real external shocks. Therefore, the sign of the interaction term between 
shock and product concentration (diversification) is expected to be negative (positive). 
3.2.2 Financial development, diversification, and exchange rate regime choice  
It is now established that financial development has a direct impact on the exchange 
rate regime choice. Financial development mitigates exchange rate volatility, and is 
therefore conducive to reaping the benefits of flexible exchange rate (Eichengreen, 
1994). This has also been established empirically by Lin and Ye (2011), among others. 
The interaction effect between financial development and diversification in the 
exchange rate regime determination is not clear-cut, because the argument could go 
either way. For example, Saint-Paul (1992) argues that developed financial markets lead 
to greater specialization, because risks arising from specialization can be insured in the 
financial market. In the absence of financial markets, diversification can be an avenue 
27 It must be noted, however, that both Kenen and Corden provide these arguments in support of 
the formation of a currency union (which is itself a fixed exchange regime from the viewpoint 
of the member country). Although a currency union may have other benefits in a specific 
environment, such as increased trade with the union members (Frankel and Rose, 2002), the 
above arguments do not necessarily imply that a currency union is the best choice for an 
economy facing real external shocks.
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by which to mitigate the risks of production. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha 
(2003) empirically support the argument above that countries with developed financial 
markets are better able to insure against idiosyncratic shocks, and thus can exploit the 
benefits of specialisation based on their comparative advantage. This suggests that 
financial development itself leads to more specialization (or less diversification). It also 
points to a negative (positive) sign for the interaction effect between concentration 
(diversification) and financial development, given that the economy can tolerate more 
specialisation, leading to the adoption of fixed regimes. In other words, the ‘fear of 
floating’ effect of diversification, which normally leads to flexible regimes, is mitigated 
in developed financial markets.28 On the other hand, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)
observe that economies in the early stages of their development (as well as less
developed countries which are also financially underdeveloped) have fewer
opportunities to diversify, because they have less capital to invest. They argue that this
lack of capital allows them to undertake only a limited number of imperfectly correlated 
projects. Moreover, these countries will seek insurance by investing in safe but less 
productive assets. All of these factors reduce the room for diversification. However, as 
financial markets develop, the concentration is reduced, due to a variety of investments, 
and more flexible regimes can be adopted.29
Given the role of product diversification in exchange rate determination, as discussed 
earlier, it can therefore be argued that the interaction between diversification and 
financial market development is a valid mechanism for exchange rate choice, but the 
direction of the effect is an empirical question.
28 Admittedly, this effect is more applicable to developed countries with developed financial 
markets.
29 This argument is more applicable to developing countries.
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3.2.3 Rent-seeking, diversification, and exchange rate regime choice  
The direct effect of rent-seeking on the regime choice is likely to act through the 
political economy channel. Concentration may be associated with only a handful of 
interest groups in an economy, who may lobby the government for protection through 
the exchange rate regime. Protection may be granted to such groups by fixing the 
currency at a devalued rate in order to cover their lack of competitive ability in 
international markets. Thus, in a political equilibrium, a fixed regime may emerge as an 
outcome of what is now very well-known to be special interest politics (see the seminal 
work of Grossman and Helpman 1994). The mechanism here implies that, analogous to 
the determination of trade policy with tariff rates as an instrument of protection, a 
lobbying process may be behind the exchange rate regime choice. Conversely, 
diversification implies that there is a greater number of interest groups, greater political 
competition, and a limited scope for rent-seeking (or limited rewards from a given 
lobbying activity), as is reflected in the choice of a more flexible regime.
In terms of the interaction effect, the diversification levels of an economy depend 
crucially on rent-seeking. Ades and Di Tella (1999) document the fact that corruption,
the most common proxy for rent-seeking in the literature, is higher in countries which 
are dominated by a few firms. More specialised production structures facilitate the 
capture of the resources by the powerful elite, thus increasing the scope for rent-
seeking. De Waldemar (2010) establishes the negative effect of corruption on 
diversification through the channel of innovation, as corruption retards innovation. 
Alesina and Wagner (2006) hypothesise and show empirically that institutional quality,
which is closely associated with corruption, has a U-shaped relationship with exchange 
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rate regime flexibility. The above arguments suggest that product diversification is 
likely to be associated with low levels of corruption, which facilitates the choice of a 
flexible exchange rate policy.
3.3 Data 
This study exploits a cross-sectional dataset covering the period 1971 to 2000 for 125
developed and developing countries. As diversification is a long-run phenomenon,
cross-country analysis is well-suited to the examination of its relationship with regime 
choice. We also adopt a five-year averaged pooled panel, with the objective of 
examining the temporal dimension in the relationship and checking for the robustness of 
cross-sectional findings. Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) de facto exchange rate regime 
classification is commonly used in the literature for classifying exchange rate systems, 
and hence will be adopted in this study too. The categorisation of regimes is based on 
the actual behaviour of exchange rates observed from parallel or dual exchange rate 
markets.30 The product diversification measure is the commonly used metric, the
‘Herfindahl index (HI)’, which is expressed as the summation of the squared shares of 
all sectors in the total employment. The index takes values between 0 and 1, where 
lower values indicate a higher level of diversification. In an economy with a low value 
of the Herfindahl measure, production activities are dispersed across a wide range of 
sectors. We have constructed HI from UNIDO (2003), which provides manufacturing 
data at 3-digit level of disaggregation, in accordance with International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC). The data are available as employment shares across 
different manufacturing sectors, and cover a wide range of countries over a long period
of time. Table 1 describes all of the other variables, as well as their data sources. 
30 A list of the exchange rate regimes is provided in Table 2 in Chapter 1.
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables. Because HI is the inverse 
of diversification, we use ‘concentration’ as the summary indicator of the real economy
from now on. A scatter plot of regime choice against concentration is displayed using 
the locally weighted smoothing technique. Figure 1 shows that the relationship between 
regime choice and concentration is linear and negative. The parametric quadratic fitted 
line confirms the fact that the relationship between regime choice and diversification is 
indeed negative (Figure 2). Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in 
the empirical analysis. Among the four main explanatory variables, the proxy for 
financial development (findev) is somewhat correlated with corruption, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.55.  
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 Model specification 
We aim to examine the direct effect of product diversification on regime choice, as well 
as the interaction effects between diversification and shock, financial development, and 
corruption, based on the theoretical discussions above. In the language of interaction 
models, concentration is the ‘focal independent’ variable, and shock, financial 
development, and corruption are the ‘moderator variables’. For an interaction effect to 
exist, the effect of the focal independent variable on the outcome variable (regime 
choice) must vary based on the level of moderator variable. Therefore, we formulate 
the following empirical model:
ܴ݁݃݅݉݁௜ =  ߚ଴ +  ߚଵܿ݋݊ܿ݁݊௜ +  ߚଶݏ݄݋ܿ݇௜ +  ߚଷܿ݋݊ܿ݁݊௜ כ ݏ݄݋ܿ݇௜ +
 ߚସ݂݅݊݀݁ݒ௜  +  ߚହܿ݋݊ܿ݁݊௜ כ ݂݅݊݀݁ݒ௜ + ߚ଺ܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌௜ +  ߚ଻ܿ݋݊ܿ݁݊௜ כ ܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌௜ +
 ܆ߜ +  ߝ௜ … … … (1)
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where i is a country index; concen is a measure of sectoral concentration (the opposite 
of sectoral diversification); shock is the terms of trade shock, measured as the standard 
deviation of terms of trade within the sample period; findev is the share of private credit 
in GDP, proxying the development of the financial sector; and corrup is a measure of 
corruption, proxying the rent-seeking mechanism. Finally, X is a vector which includes 
other controls and some fixed factors which can affect exchange rate regime choice
directly.31
As per the control variables, some common determinants of regime choice in the
literature include the level of development, country size, trade openness (openness), 
capital account openness (kaopen), and current account balance. To minimize the 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables, we go back to the correlation matrix 
(Table 3). Per capita income (lgdpc), representing the level of development is highly 
correlated with diversification à la Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), but it is also highly 
correlated with financial development (findev) and corruption (corrup). Therefore, we 
do not include it among the base controls. Log GDP, a measure of country size, is
highly correlated with findev, but another measure, namely log population, does not;
and therefore, we use the log population as a proxy for country size. Trade openness is 
an important determinant of regime choice, in that highly open economies may find 
fixed regimes more attractive, because fluctuating exchange rates under flexible regimes 
may be costly for highly open economies, where trade and investment are crucial 
(Corden 2002).  However, it is closely correlated with the log population in our dataset,
and therefore we do not include it among the base controls. Countries with highly open 
31 The list of possible determinants for regime choice is quite long. For example, Juhn and 
Mauro (2002) identify as many as 30 different determinants from empirical studies.
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capital account systems should choose either hard peg or fully flexible regime,
according to the ‘Bi-polar view’ of exchange rate regime choice (see Eichengreen 
1994). Meanwhile, the current account balance acts as a proxy for the currency crisis 
factor (see Von Hagen and Zhou 2007); a high and persistent current account deficit 
may not be conducive to fixed regimes. Based on these correlations, we select only log 
population, capital account openness, and current account balance as our base controls. 
Variables which are commonly used in the macro-comparative development literature 
to represent country-fixed factors, and which can be associated with omitted variables,
are also included in our models. These include two geographic variables, namely, 
landlockedness and latitude (see Ramcharan 2010). Landlockedness can act as a proxy 
for natural barriers to openness (see Poirson 2001), while latitude controls for climate 
and its impact on work conditions. Likewise, we also include dummies for countries’ 
colonial past, to capture historical institutional factors and other ties that countries may 
have with their former rulers. A dummy for major oil exporting countries is also 
incorporated throughout the models, as its omission may cause endogeneity, due to its 
possible simultaneous effect on both regime choice and diversification.
As was discussed in Section 3.2, the sign of ȕ1, reflecting the direct effect of 
concentration, should be negative i.e., a lower concentration (higher diversification) 
should lead to flexible regimes. Given the theoretical discussion, the anticipated sign for
the direct effect of financial development is such that it should lead to floating regimes.
The predicted signs of the direct effects of real shock and corruption are ambiguous. 
The signs of the coefficients of the interaction terms between concentration and real 
shock, and between concentration and financial development, are negative and 
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ambiguous, respectively. On the other hand, the sign of the coefficient of the interaction 
term between concentration and corruption is likely to be negative. 
In a model with interaction term(s), the main focus should be on the marginal effect of 
the focal explanatory variable on the dependent variable; singular attention to the 
magnitude and significance of the individual coefficients may lead to the omission of 
important information. For instance, it is possible that the marginal effect of 
concentration on regime choice is significant only at some values of the shock, in which 
case, insignificance of the point estimate of ȕ2 in equation (1) would not necessarily 
mean that the effect is insignificant for all values of the shock: it just means that the 
average direct effect is insignificant. Therefore, for a careful examination, the focus 
should be on the joint impact of the relevant estimates, e.g., the joint significance of ȕ1
and ȕ3 in the case above (see Wooldridge 2002; Hadad, Lim and Saborowsky 2010).
Consequently, we are interested in the marginal effect of concentration on regime 
choice, which is given by the following derivative term: 
ߜܴ݁݃݅݉݁
ߜܿ݋݊ܿ݁݊  =  ߚଵ + ߚଷ כ ݏ݄݋ܿ݇ +  ߚହ כ ݂݅݊݀݁ݒ +  ߚ଻ כ ܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌ … … . (2) 
In order to find the values of shocks at which concentration may have a significant 
impact on regime choice, this derivative is evaluated at the mean of findev and corrup.
The corresponding standard errors for marginal effects can be calculated using the 
‘delta method’. The results can also be presented by a confidence interval (CI) graph,
illustrating the range of shocks over which concentration has an impact on regime 
choice. The marginal effect of concentration with respect to findev and corrup is 
investigated in a similar vein.
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3.4.2 Estimation issues 
In terms of panel treatment, a fixed effects model delivers completely insignificant 
results, which is not surprising, given that diversification is likely to change slowly over 
time (at least for most countries), and/or its relationship with regime choice is 
dependent on the between-country variation. Thus, we choose the cross-sectional 
dataset as our baseline data. Nevertheless, we also adopt a pooled panel analysis for a 
robustness check, controlling for common time effects, a common time trend, and 
clustering of the standard errors at the country level. Our results are qualitatively similar 
across cross-sectional and (pooled) panel datasets.
Another estimation issue is related to the type of the dependent variable. Countries 
choose a set of exchange rate arrangements from a continuum of policy choices to make 
up their exchange rate regimes. The de facto classification of Reinhart-Rogoff 
categorizes this spectrum into 14 groups. If two countries differ only slightly in their 
exchange rate arrangements, they are likely to be placed in the same group. For 
countries to be allocated into different groups, they must have made sufficiently 
different policy choices. The question that arises here is whether these 14 groups should 
be treated as ordinal variables, or as continuous variables rounded to integers. Even if 
one views these categories as ordinal, it seems that having 14 different regimes makes
the underlying categorization almost indistinguishable from a continuous measure.32
32 The Monte Carlo simulations of Johnson and Creech (1983) demonstrate that grouping a 
continuous measure into a finite number of categories is unlikely to create a measurement error 
problem if the number of categories is greater than five. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) 
find that cardinality vs. ordinality assumptions regarding happiness scores make little difference 
to the results.
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Averaging these integers over 30 years also makes them practically continuous. Thus, 
without much loss of generality, we treat the dependent variable as continuous.33
Equation (1) is initially estimated via OLS. However, endogeneity may result because 
of reverse causation, in that fixed exchange rate regimes may keep economies 
concentrated in a few sectors, due to the ‘protection’ they provide. Thus, we address 
this problem through instrumental variables and identification-through-
heteroskedasticity methods.
3.4.2.1 Instrumental variables estimation
Ideally, an instrumental variable should approximate a randomized experiment, but it is 
difficult to find such an experiment in the case of diversification. Following the 
common practice, we therefore resort to variables that satisfy the desirable properties 
for an instrument conditional on some covariates. Countries’ neighbours are likely to 
have these properties, predicated on the identifying assumption that the diversification 
level of a typical country is positively related to those of its neighbours. Bordering 
countries may share joint histories, similar geography and initial conditions, and parallel 
development trajectories. Our aim is to formulate a specification whereby a country’s 
neighbours constitute a ‘reference group’, the development trajectory of which has not
33 Aghion et al. (2009) also consider the RR classification as continuous, and use it as 
explanatory variable by taking its five-year average. Further, several other measures in the 
literature which are constructed in a similar way are treated as continuous. For instance, Polity 
IV indicators or Freedom House political rights and civil liberties measures are often used as 
both the dependent variable, as well as the lagged dependent variable or explanatory variables 
on the right-hand side.
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been affected by the country’s own exchange rate regime.34 Thus, we take advantage of 
neighbours’ size-(GDP)weighted diversification as an instrument.
Our identification strategy relies on the following two assumptions. First, for most 
countries, their neighbours are likely to constitute a control group which possesses a 
parallel development trajectory. Second, conditional on covariates, neighbours’ 
trajectories are not affected by the country’s exchange rate regime. If these two 
assumptions are true, then neighbours could provide the diversification path that a 
country would have followed if its own diversification structure had not been affected 
by its exchange rate regime.35 For this identification strategy to work, we need to satisfy 
two conditions. First, any factors that might prevent the neighbours from being an 
exogenous counterfactual should be controlled for. Second, conditional on the 
covariates, neighbours should affect a country only through diversification, and the 
factors that shaped the neighbours’ diversification structures in the past should not 
affect a country’s exchange rate regime choice today. These conditions are commonly 
known as the exclusion restriction and exogeneity properties, respectively, for an 
instrument. With respect to the first condition above, we already control for possible 
observable factors such as landlockedness, colonial past, and country size. In addition to 
these, we also control for the neighbours’ shares in the overall trade, and include 
dummy indicators as to whether the countries are the members of regional trade 
agreements, including the European Union (EU), Commonwealth of Independent States 
34 This measure is like WD, where W is a spatial weighting matrix (obtained using a contiguity 
matrix, which takes a value of 1 if a country i borders country j and 0 otherwise, which is 
weighted by the neighbours’ sizes, i.e., GDP) and D is the neighbours’ diversification levels. 
Using neighbours’ surface areas or populations as measures of size provides similar results.
35 This trajectory does not have to be the same trajectory as the country’s; it suffices that it be 
parallel, or have a reasonably similar slope.
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(CIS), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Controlling for these 
variables aims to ensure that the development paths of the neighbours are not distorted 
by the country in question due to interactions that might take place among the 
neighbours in the sample period. To check for the second condition above, we include 
the neighbours’ GDP-weighted exchange rate regime in the first- and second-stage IV 
regressions, and find that this variable is always estimated to be insignificant. This 
finding is not entirely surprising, given that diversification has a broader scope than a
macroeconomic policy that may change more rapidly.36 Overall, our chosen instrument
seems to be doing a good job of identifying the effect of diversification; however, we 
will check its robustness below using a different methodology.37
First-Stage and Reduced Form Results: Table 4 presents a battery of test results
relating to the reliability of neighbours’ GDP-weighted concentration. For cross-
sectional data, the first-stage results show that a country’s own concentration is robustly 
36 Motivated by both the trade and transport engineering literature, as well as by the new 
economic geography which stresses the influence of transport costs on production patterns, 
Ramcharan (2010) uses countries’ topographical characteristics as the instruments of product 
diversification. The idea is that topographical characteristics, such as terrain variability and soil 
drainage, which affect the transport cost of production across space, can affect product 
diversification. Ramcharan uses two topography-related variables, namely the distribution of 
land area by elevation, and bioclimatic classes, which are available for about 70 countries. 
Another topography-related variable is the terrain ruggedness index (‘ruggedness’), constructed 
by Nunn and Puga (2012), which quantifies topographic heterogeneity. Data for this later 
variable are available for a larger number of countries. However, none of these topography-
related variables make strong instruments according to the Stock and Yogo (2005) rule, and 
therefore they cannot be used in our estimation. 
37 Of the three moderator variables in equation (1), real shock can be considered as exogenous, 
but the exchange rate literature suggests that financial sector development and corruption may 
be endogenous. We instrument these variables with their initial values in the cross-sectional 
estimation. The interactions between these variables and product diversification are also 
endogenous and are instrumented with their respective initial values, interacted with the 
neighbours’ size-weighted diversification. We use the initial values of two baseline controls, 
such as capital account openness and current account balance, in the cross-sectional analysis. In 
five-year averaged panel, we adopt the pre-determined values of the explanatory variables 
(except for shock, in which case we use the contemporaneous value).
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and positively related to its neighbours’. In column 1, the instrument is significant at the 
1% level when heteroskedasticity is not corrected. The F-statistic of the excluded 
instrument for this estimation is 17.25. The F-statistic becomes somewhat smaller (i.e., 
12.70) when base controls and fixed factors are included in the regressions (column 2). 
With heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, the estimate remains significant at the 
5% level (column 3), with the F-statistic being 6.37. When three baseline controls and 
fixed factors are included in the first stage, the F-statistic on the excluded instrument is 
5.85 (column 4). However, the results confirm that the explanatory power of our 
instrument is not reduced very much in the second stage when controls are included. 
The scatter plots in Figures 3 and 4 (both non-parametric and parametric) also confirm 
the positive relationship between concentration and our IV. The Shea partial R2 value of 
0.13 in the first stage regressions is not very high, suggesting that the instrument may be 
somewhat weak. However, the instrument is not under-identified, as can be seen from 
the under-identification tests in the last row of Table 4. The reduced form specifications 
which examine the link between regime choice and the instruments directly show that 
our instrument is significant both with and without controls (columns 5 and 6). As we 
get mixed messages about the strength of our instrument based on the first-stage F-
statistics and the Shea partial R2, we estimate our models via Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood (LIML), which is robust to the weak instruments problem.38
38 In the full model, the F-statistics of excluded instruments for six endogenous variables, 
namely concentration, financial development, corruption, and interactions between 
concentration and shock, and financial development, and corruption, are 7.88, 29.54, 56.94, 
5.02, 7.91, and 13.28, respectively. 
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3.4.2.2 Identification through heteroskedasticity
Although we have argued that our external instrument (neighbours’ size-weighted 
diversification) is plausible, it would be useful to cross-check the identification obtained 
this way. For instance, one could argue that unobservable omitted variables, such as
historical trade links, entrepreneurship, and various other determinants of economic and 
political equilibria, may also play a role in the determination of the right-hand-side 
variable and exchange rate regime choice. We employ an alternative identification 
which was proposed recently by Lewbel (2012), and which does not rely on exclusion 
restrictions but exploits heteroskedastic disturbances for identification. In this approach, 
identification is obtained through a set of exogenous variable(s) (Z), which can be a 
subset of exogenous regressors (X) in the regression equation (Z can also include 
traditional instruments), whereby, in the first stage, endogenous variables are regressed 
on the Z vector, followed by the retrieval of the residuals ߝƸ. Using these residuals, (Z –
ҧܼ)*ߝƸ, where ҧܼ  is the mean of Z, is constructed, and can then be used as instruments in 
the second stage. For this method to work, the residuals ߝƸ must be heteroskedastic. The 
second-stage regression can be estimated through the usual IV methods.39
Equation (1) includes six endogenous variables, i.e., concentration, financial 
development, corruption, and their three interactions. In the first stage of the method, 
we regress the endogenous variables on the log population, initial share of the current 
account balance in GDP, initial capital account openness, and latitude, which are 
exogenous in equation (1). For our main endogenous variable, i.e., concentration, the Z
vector also includes neighbours’ sizes, weighted concentration as the standard 
39 For other studies which use the Lewbel method, see Emran and Hou (2011) and Sabia (2007).
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instrument, but our results are robust to the complete exclusion of this variable from the 
Lewbel approach. The Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity for all endogenous variables at the 1% level of significance. The 
second stage instruments are obtained using the construction described above.
Once the instruments have been generated a la Lewbel (2012), we estimate our models 
by GMM (which is more efficient than 2SLS). As we obtain more than one instrument
for each endogenous variable, our model is over-identified. The major advantage of the 
IVs obtained via this method is that they are free from the exclusion restrictions 
concerns, and thus, over-identification tests, such as Hansen’s J (or Sargan) test, 
produce statistically reliable results. The point to emphasize here is that our results in 
relation to the marginal effects of concentration on exchange rate regime choice are 
stable across different identification methodologies.
3.5 Estimation results
3.5.1 OLS, instrumental variables, and identification through heteroskedasticity
We now discuss the estimation results for equation (1) using OLS, LIML, and the 
Lewbel method. We first consider the direct effect of diversification on regime choice, 
as well as each channel in isolation. In LIML regressions, we include the neighbours’ 
trade share in the overall trade and dummies for regional trade agreement membership 
in the second stage regressions, along with base controls and fixed factors. Including 
neighbours’ share in overall trade reduces the sample size substantially. We check 
thoroughly as to whether this variable affects the inference regarding the main 
explanatory variables, and find that it does not drive the results. Thus, we exclude this 
variable from all second stage regressions presented.
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Table 5 presents the results for equation (1), examining only the direct effect, in the 
absence of the interaction terms. The table reports the findings with the OLS, LIML and 
the Lewbel estimator. The OLS regression, which also includes the initial values of base 
controls and fixed factors, indicates a highly significant negative relationship between 
regime choice and concentration. The corresponding IV estimates using LIML, reported 
in columns 3 and 4, also support this finding. Table 5 also reports the estimation results 
obtained using the Lewbel technique, estimated with GMM (column 5 and 6). These 
GMM estimates are more efficient than the OLS estimates, as is evidenced by the lower 
standard errors of the former estimates. The over-identification tests affirm the 
statistical reliability of our standard IV, given that instruments generated by the Lewbel 
method provide a sound basis for these tests.   
The negative coefficient of concentration implies that a higher level of sectoral 
diversification (concentration) leads to flexible (fixed) regimes. This finding shows that 
product diversification alters countries’ ‘fear of floating’ behaviour, which was first 
observed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). In other words, diversified economies are less 
fearful of floating.  
Table 6 displays the results for each interaction effect in isolation. The first three 
columns show the results using OLS, LIML and the Lewbel method for the real shock 
absorption channel, including base controls and fixed factors. It can be seen that all 
coefficients have the same signs across different estimation methods. The signs of both 
the concentration coefficient and the interaction term are negative, implying that the 
marginal effect of concentration (diversification) on regime, conditional on the impact 
of the shock, is negative, i.e., leading to fixed (flexible) regimes. The marginal effect 
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will be more negative as the impact of real shocks increases. The coefficients of the 
concentration index and the shock are significant in the OLS regressions in column 1 
and the Lewbel regressions in column 3, but the interaction term is not. The instruments 
used for Lewbel method estimation are also valid, as can be seen from the over-
identification test results. 
The results for the financial development mechanism in isolation are presented in 
columns 4 to 6 in Table 6. The direct effect of concentration is always significant. The 
coefficient of the interaction is significant only with the Lewbel regression in column 6. 
The coefficients of concentration and financial development are also significant in the 
Lewbel estimates, and over-identifying restrictions are valid for the Lewbel method 
regression as well. The joint significance of the coefficient of concentration and the 
interaction is also robust across different models and different estimation techniques, 
suggesting that the financial development has a strong influence on concentration and 
regime choice. 
The last three columns of Table 6 present the results on the rent-seeking or corruption 
channel. Both the interaction and the direct effect are robustly significant across 
different estimation techniques, yielding strongly significant coefficients at the 1% 
level. The over-identification restrictions are also valid. The coefficients of 
concentration and the interaction term are jointly significant in all specifications. The 
effect of concentration conditional on the corruption level is negative, suggesting that 
concentration leads to fixed regimes in more corrupt economies. The effect will be less 
negative and will tend to zero at higher values of the corruption index; that is, the effect 
becomes smaller as the corruption level decreases.  
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The full model includes concentration, all three of the moderator variables, and the three 
interaction terms, running a ‘horse race’ among the channels identified. We have 
estimated OLS and LIML regressions, as well as the Lewbel method using GMM, and 
report two regressions for each method: one including the base controls, with the six 
main variables mentioned above, and the other including both the base controls and the 
fixed factors.  The results are presented in Table 7 in columns 1 to 6. The point 
estimates of the concentration and corruption channels are significant in OLS 
regressions at the 5% level, but the shock and financial development channels are not 
(column 1). The concentration and corruption channels remain significant at the 5% 
level after controlling for the fixed factors (column 2). However, the coefficients of 
concentration and all three mechanisms are jointly significant in both regressions. The 
LIML regressions find no point estimate to be individually significant in column 3 and 
4; however, the corresponding Lewbel method estimates in column 5 and 6 show that 
coefficients of the concentration and corruption channels are significant. The direct 
effect of shock is also significant in columns 5 and 6. These regressions pass over-
identification tests as well. The coefficients of concentration and the three interaction 
terms are also jointly significant in both regressions in columns 5 and 6.     
It is noticeable that the shock channel is never significant in any of the regressions in 
the full model. It was not also significant when we estimated each channel in isolation 
in Table 6. This could be ascribed to multicollinearity, or the shock channel’s effect 
may be able to be explained by other factors which are included in the model. However, 
it may also mean that a short-run phenomenon like shock is completely insignificant in 
a cross-sectional dataset which captures relatively more long-run effects. Columns 1 to 
6 are then re-estimated, omitting the insignificant real shock channel. This exercise also 
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helps us to gain about 20 additional data points. The results are presented in Table 7 in 
columns 7 to 12. The corresponding OLS results improve somewhat, as can be seen 
from columns 7 and 8, where the concentration becomes significant at higher levels.
The LIML results improve significantly, as the concentration coefficient is now 
significant in columns 9 and 10 at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Moreover, the 
corruption channel also becomes significant in column 10 at the 10% level. Another 
positive aspect of the exclusion of the shock channel is that the coefficients of 
concentration and two remaining channels are now jointly significant in both 
regressions. The corresponding Lewbel estimates in columns 11 and 12 remain similar 
to those in columns 5 and 6 with respect to the coefficient significance, over-
identification restrictions validity, and the joint significance of the concentration and 
interaction coefficients.
We also re-estimated all of the OLS and LIML regressions with neighbours’-size 
weighted concentration as IV by using the five-year averaged panel data and including 
time dummies and a common time trend in each regression.40 The standard errors are 
also clustered at the country level. We do not replicate the Lewbel method estimates, 
because this method has not been proven to be suited to panel data. Table 8 reports the 
results for the direct effect and the full model. Conclusions similar to those reached for 
the cross-sectional dataset largely hold. That is, the direct effect of concentration on 
regime choice is negative, leading to fixed regimes (column 1 and 2). For the full model 
with three interactions (columns 3 and 4), the corruption channel is significant in both 
the OLS and LIML regressions and the shock channel is significant in the LIML 
40 The inclusion of current account balance to relative GDP reduces the sample size drastically 
in pooled panel estimation, so we use only capital account openness and log population as the 
base controls.
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regressions, but the financial development channel is largely insignificant. In order to be 
consistent with the cross-sectional regressions, we run the full model without the shock 
channel (regressions 5 and 6). The corruption channel is significant only in regression 6 
when estimated by LIML. The coefficients of the concentration and interaction terms 
are also jointly significant for this regression (column 6). 
3.5.2 The marginal effect of concentration on regime choice, conditional on the 
moderator variables  
The regression results presented in the section above only provide the point estimates. 
They do not tell us much about the marginal effect of concentration, conditional on 
different values of the moderator variables. In this section, we present the effects of 
concentration on regime choice, conditional on the values of shocks, financial 
development, and corruption, graphically, with the aid of confidence interval (CI) 
graphs. We construct the CI figures based on the full model in Table 7 using the Lewbel 
method, which includes all relevant controls. The CI figures based on corresponding IV 
estimations largely tell the same story.
Figure 5 presents the CI graph which represents the marginal effect of concentration at 
different levels of shocks. The figure is drawn using the estimates from column 6 in 
Table 7. In the figure, the solid horizontal line is the zero line, and the solid downward 
sloping line represents the different values of the marginal effect of concentration on 
regime choice when the incidence of shocks varies. For the marginal effect of 
concentration conditional on shock to be significant, the upper and lower bounds of the 
CI (the dashed lines) should be simultaneously either above or below the zero line. 
Figure 5 shows that the marginal effect of concentration on regime choice is negative 
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throughout the whole range of shocks, meaning that a higher concentration leads to 
fixed regimes.  However, the effect is significant only at the higher levels of shocks. 
More specifically, the effect is significant when the impact of the real shock, as 
measured by the standard deviation of terms of trade, is above 14. A list of the countries 
which fall in this range is provided below the figure. With the exception of Japan and 
Spain, these countries are mainly the emerging and less developed economies of the 
world. It can also be seen that these countries are relatively concentrated: the mean 
value of their concentration is 0.17, which is higher than the mean value of 
concentration for other countries outside the range (0.13), and slightly above the sample 
mean of 0.16. This may imply that the impact of shocks is likely to be amplified if 
countries are concentrated, which will be reflected in their choice of a fixed exchange 
rate regime. 
Figure 6 shows the marginal effect of concentration on regime choice, conditional on 
financial sector development, from the full model excluding shocks (column 12 in 
Table 7). As the marginal effect in this regression depends on the level of financial 
development and corruption, we draw the graph by fixing the value of corruption at its 
mean, and let the financial development level vary. It can be seen from Figure 6 that the 
negative marginal effect is significant for those countries where the level of financial 
development, as measured by private sector credit as percentage of GDP, is 40% or 
lower. The negative marginal effect implies that concentration will lead to fixed 
regimes. A list of countries for which the effect is significant is provided after Figure 6.
Again, these are all developing countries, with the exception of Denmark and Iceland.
The marginal effect is positive when private sector credit is 73% of GDP, i.e., at a high 
level of financial development. However, the positive marginal effect is not significant. 
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These results are consistent with Acemoglu and Zilibotti’s (1997) argument, given in 
Section 2, that countries with weaker financial markets are unable to diversify, and 
hence, tend to adopt fixed regimes.
The marginal effect of concentration on regime choice, conditional on the corruption 
level, and calculated using the estimates from column 12 in Table 7, is presented in 
Figure 7.  To draw the graph, we keep the value of financial development fixed at its 
mean value, and let the corruption level vary. The graph shows that the marginal effect 
is significant for those countries where the corruption level is relatively high (i.e., where 
the values of corruption are relatively lower). The exact threshold value in Figure 7 is 
3.7. Thus, the marginal effect of concentration is negative and significant, leading to a 
fixed regime when the value of the corruption index is lower than 3.7 (higher values 
indicate a lower level of corruption). The magnitudes of the negative marginal effect 
become smaller and smaller as the corruption level decreases (higher values in the 
graph). The implication of this finding is that, in countries with higher levels of 
corruption, concentration, by leading to more fixed regimes, creates more rent-seeking 
opportunities, presumably for a few elites. The list of 73 the countries for which the 
marginal effect is significant is provided below Figure 7. With one exception (i.e., 
Italy), all these countries are developing countries, including low, medium and high 
income oil exporting countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
Figure 7 also shows that the marginal effect of concentration becomes positive, and thus 
leads to a flexible regime, for very low corruption countries, i.e., countries with a
corruption index higher than about 5.7. In our sample, this means a few developed 
countries such as Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
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New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. However, the marginal effect of 
concentration is not significant for these countries. 
Overall, the CI figures reveal that the marginal effect of concentration on regime choice 
is significant for those developing countries which experience larger shocks, and have a 
low level of financial development and a relatively high corruption level. In all cases, 
the marginal effect of concentration is negative, leading to fixed regimes; or, 
alternatively, higher diversification leads to flexible regimes.
3.6 Conclusion
This study examines the effect of product diversification on exchange rate regime 
choice using a cross-sectional dataset covering 125 countries over the period 1971–
2000. It provides very useful evidence as to the ways in which changing production 
patterns in the real sector can shape one of the central macroeconomic policies of a 
country. The paper identifies three mechanisms through which diversification and 
regime choice may be related, namely the real shock absorption, financial sector 
development, and rent-seeking channels. Along with a hypothesised direct effect, the 
paper then runs a ‘horse race’ among the identified mechanisms. A dual identification 
strategy involving instrumental variables estimation, with the neighbours’ GDP-
weighted diversification as the instrument, together with Lewbel’s (2012) ‘identification 
through heteroskedasticity’, have been used to tackle the possible endogeneity. Our 
results in relation to the marginal effect of product diversification are robust and stable 
across both different identification methods, and cross-sectional and panel datasets.
It is found that product diversification has a direct and significant effect on regime 
choice, leading countries towards flexible regimes. This finding is robust to the 
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inclusion of several controls in the models, and implies that a diversification of 
production activities makes countries less likely to feel the fear of adopting a floating 
regime which Calvo and Reinhart (2002) argued. The results also reveal that 
diversification affects regime choice through a rent-seeking channel, which is proxied 
by the level of corruption in the country. Robustly significant across different 
specifications, this finding suggests that, in countries with higher levels of corruption, 
sectoral concentration leads to fixed regimes, as this type of regime may provide more 
scope for rent-seeking for the powerful elite.  There is also some evidence for the shock 
absorption channel across various model specifications, suggesting that the real shock 
channel moderates the diversification opportunity for developing countries which 
experience higher incidences of real shocks. The financial development channel is 
found to be significant as well, especially for developing countries with low levels of 
financial development. In general, it can be concluded that the three channels identified 
in this paper do affect diversification, and thus exchange rate regime choice is more 
pronounced for developing countries.
Finally, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the concept of diversification 
and how it interacts with other national indicators in shaping a key macroeconomic 
policy choice. In view of recent surge in interest for diversification and its links with 
economic development, structural change, volatility, and productivity growth, we 
believe that the mechanisms put forward in this paper can shed light on the appropriate
policy options available for countries that are at different stages of productive capacity 
and institutional development. 
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Variables and data sources
Variables Description Data Source
Regime Exchange rate regime choice, Reinhart-Rogoff  fine
classification  (1 to 14 scale), higher values indicate more 
flexible regimes.
Ilzetzki, Reinhart 
and Rogoff.
(2008)
concen Herfindahl index, a measure of sectoral concentration, 0 to 
1scale, higher values indicate higher concentration (lower 
diversification).
UNIDO (2003)  
concen_neigh Neighbours’ GDP-weighted concentration index. 
Instrument for concentration index.
Calculated by the
authors
findev Private sector credit to GDP, a proxy for financial sector 
development.
WB Financial 
Structure 
Database
shock The standard deviation of  terms of trade, a proxy for real 
shock.
WDI
corrup Corruption, proxy for rent-seeking, 0 to 6 scale, higher 
value indicates lower corruption.
ICRG,  the PRS 
Group
kaopen Capital account openness index (0 to 1), higher values
indicate higher levels of capital account openness.
Chinn and Ito 
(2008)
open  Trade openness, the share of export and import of goods 
and services in GDP.
Penn World 
Tables 6.3
lgdp Log of GDP in current dollar, measuring size of the 
economy.
WDI
lgdpc Log of per capita GDP in USD.  Penn World 
Tables
lpop Log population. WDI
cabal Current account balance as percentage of GDP, a proxy for 
currency crisis factor. 
WDI
landlocked A landlocked country dummy. CIA World Fact
Book
Colonial past Dummy for former colonial past. La Porta et al.
(1999)
rugged Terrain ruggedness. Nunn and Puga 
(2012)
lat The absolute value of the latitude of each country,
normalised to 0–1.
Ramcharan
(2010)
trade_neigh Neighbours’ share in overall trade, calculated by the 
authors using data from the Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOTS).
DOTS (IMF)
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of main variables (cross-sectional data)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev.
Min Max
Exchange Rate Regime Choice (Regime) 163 7.10 3.71 1 14
Concentration Index (concen) 155 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.75
Real Shock (shock) 106 19.98 17.43 1.31 85.17
Financial Development (findev) 155 0.33 0.28 0.01 1.46
Corruption (corrup) 137 3.29 1.22 0.28 6
Table 3: Correlation matrix (cross-sectional data)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
          
11
1. concen 1.00
2. shock 0.17 1.00
3. findev –0.37 –0.41 1.00
4. corrup –0.32 –0.47 0.55 1.00
5. kaopen –0.28 –0.22 0.42 0.46 1.00
6. open 0.09 –0.05 0.14 –0.02 0.16 1.00
7. lgdp –0.52 –0.31 0.59 0.50 0.44 –0.33 1.00
8. lpop –0.25 0.01 0.07 –0.13 –0.04 –0.51 0.64 1.00
9. lgdpc –0.45 –0.37 0.67 0.72 0.57 0.08 0.66 –0.13 1.00
10. cabal –0.29 –0.25 0.49 0.25 0.41 0.11 0.52 0.11 0.58 –0.18 1.00
Note: See Table 1 above for a description of the variables. 
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Table 4: First stage (FS) and reduced form (RF) results: 
neighbours’ GDP-weighted concentration as IV (cross-sectional data)
First Stage Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Non-robust Non-robust Robust Robust
Concen_neigh 0.327*** 0.260*** 0.327** 0.260* –9.631*** –7.637*
(0.079) (0.076) (0.141) (0.143) (3.541) (4.289)
Observations 125 125 117 117 125 117
R2 0.12 0.12 0.34 0.34 0.04 0.184
Base controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Fixed Factors No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-statistic of excluded 
instrument
17.25 12.70 6.37 5.85 - -
Shea partial R2 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 - -
Under-ID test (p-val.) 15.38
(0.00)
11.63
(0.00)
4.75
(0.02)
3.83
(0.04)
- -
Note: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses for regressions 3, 4, 5 and 6.  ***, **, and * indicate 
p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. The dependent variable for the FS regressions is the 
Herfindahl concentration index (concen), and that for RF is regime choice. Concen_neigh is neighbours’
GDP weighted concentration index (IV). Base controls are initial values of capital account openness 
(kaopen), current account balance as a percentage of GDP (cabal), and log population (lpop). Fixed factors 
include a landlocked country dummy, latitude, dummies pertaining to a colonial past, and a dummy for 
major oil exporting countries. The under-ID test with robust standard errors is Kleibergen-Paap’s (2006) rk 
statistic, the under-ID test without robust standard errors is Anderson’s (1951) canonical correlations test.
Table 5: The simple relationship between concentration and regime choice 
(cross-sectional data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS LIML LIML Lewbel GMM Lewbel GMM
concen –19.64*** –19.488*** –29.31*** –32.115*** –26.385*** –20.722**
(5.319) (5.423) (6.456) (9.594) (5.995) (8.604)
Observation 122 121 117 116 116 116
R2 0.246 0.391 - - - -
Base controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed factors No Yes No Yes No Yes
Over ID Test: p-val. - - - 0.40 0.36
Note: The dependent variable is regime choice. Each model has a constant. Robust standard errors are 
given in parentheses; and ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. The baseline 
controls include the initial values of capital account openness, the ratio of current account balance to GDP,
and log population. The fixed factors include a landlocked country dummy, latitude, dummies pertaining to 
a colonial past, and a dummy for major oil exporting countries. 
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Table 8: The interaction effects of shock, financial development and rent-seeking
on regime choice — five-year averaged panel
Direct effect Full Model 
with three interactions
Full Model without
Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS LIML OLS LIML OLS LIML
concen –17.390*** –36.549** –41.083*** –11.940 –23.260* –48.231*
(4.047) (18.000) (14.543) (29.408) (11.737) (25.688)
shock 0.108 0.313**
(0.073) (0.153)
findev –0.726 2.528 0.767 1.750
(3.278) (2.204) (3.078) (2.382)
corrup –0.160 –0.122 –0.081 –0.813
(0.485) (0.489) (0.388) (0.516)
concen*shock –0.348 –2.075*
(0.512) (1.127)
concen*findev 14.568 –9.874 –6.455 –18.465
(27.289) (26.820) (26.354) (25.113)
concen*corrup 7.450** 8.898** 4.881 11.508**
(3.305) (3.958) (3.053) (4.544)
Observations 514 399 243 218 358 257
R2 0.227 - 0.249 - 0.224 -
Base Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed factors No Yes No Yes No Yes
Joint Sig. test
(F-stat, p-val)
- - 3.88
(0.00)
9.99
(0.04)
1.57
(0.20)
2.24
(0.09)
The dependent variable is regime choice. Robust standard errors, clustered to country level, are 
given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.1, respectively. Each 
model has a constant, time dummies, and a common time trend. The baseline controls are the 
one period lag of capital account openness and log population. The fixed factors include a 
landlocked country dummy, latitude, dummies pertaining to a colonial past, and a dummy for 
major oil exporting countries. The joint sig. test is the test that the coefficients of concen and the 
interaction terms are jointly zero.  
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Figure 1: Regime choice and product concentration — non-parametric fit 
Figure 2: regime choice and product concentration — quadratic fit
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Figure 3: Product concentration and Neighbours’ GDP-weighted concentration 
Figure 4: Product concentration and neighbours’ GDP-weighted concentration 
— quadratic fit 
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Figure 5: The effect of concentration on regime choice, conditional on the level
of shocks (cross-sectional data)
Countries where diversification  leads to flexible regimes at a higher level of shocks  (from 
Figure 5)
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Figure 6:  The effect of concentration on regime choice, conditional on the level 
of financial sector development (cross-sectional data)
Countries where diversification leads to flexible regimes at a lower level of 
financial development  (from Figure 6)
Albania Croatia Iran Peru
Algeria Denmark Iraq Philippines
Argentina Dominican Republic Indonesia Poland
Armenia Ecuador Iran, Islamic Rep. Saudi Arabia
Bahrain Egypt, Arab Rep. Jamaica Senegal
Bangladesh El Salvador Kenya Slovak Republic
Belgium Ethiopia Latvia Slovenia
Bolivia Gabon Libya Sri Lanka
Botswana Gambia, The Madagascar Sudan
Brazil Ghana Malawi Suriname
Bulgaria Greece Mexico Togo
Burkina Faso Guatemala Mongolia Trinidad and Tobago
Cameroon Guyana Morocco Turkey
Colombia Haiti Mozambique Uruguay
Congo, Dem. Honduras Myanmar Uruguay
Congo, Rep. Hungary Nigeria Venezuela, RB
Costa Rica Iceland Pakistan Zambia
Cote d'Ivoire India Papua New Guinea
-1
20
-1
05
-9
0
-7
5
-6
0-
45
-3
0-
15
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
10
51
20
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Financial Sector Development
Marginal Effect of Concentration
95% Confidence Interval
105
Figure 7: The effect of concentration on regime choice, conditional on the level 
of corruption (cross-sectional data)
Countries where concentration  leads to fixed regimes at a higher level of 
corruption (from Figure 7)
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Chapter 4: Exchange Rate Regime and Fiscal Discipline: 
The Joint Role of Trade Openness and Central Bank 
Independence
4.1 Introduction
There is a theoretical consensus regarding the effect of exchange rate regime choice 
on the conduct of fiscal policy (Rose 2012). However, considerable debate remains
as to which exchange rate regime provides more fiscal discipline in reality.41 One 
strand of literature, termed as the ‘traditional view’, argues that fixed exchange rate 
regime can discipline fiscal policy. This follows Keynes (1923, p 188), who 
considers the ‘Gold Standard’, a form of fixed exchange rate, as a way to ‘strap 
down the Ministers of Finance’ who are always tempted to create budget deficits. 
Along this line, fixed exchange rates mean more fiscal discipline since failure to 
maintain fiscal discipline under these regimes may be economically and politically 
costly for any government (see, among others, Aghevli, Khan and Montiel 1991; 
Frenkel and Goldstein 1988). The other strand of literature posits that a flexible 
regime is associated with more fiscal discipline (for example, Tornell and Velasco 
1995; Tornell and Velasco 2000). This happens because fiscal indiscipline has an 
almost instantaneous adverse effect under the flexible regime.
Though high and persistent budget deficits and the resulting public debt are a long-
standing macroeconomic policy concern, a refreshed analysis of their determinants 
has become a pressing need in the light of recent serious concerns for many 
developed and developing countries. For example, overall fiscal deficit stood at 
7.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) in advanced countries in 2010 (IMF 2011). 
41 The fiscal discipline refers to the ability of exchange rate regimes to contain budget 
deficit, government expenditure or public debt.
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Similarly, on average, public debt as a percentage of GDP has escalated to about 
100% in advanced countries, and in countries like Greece, public debt has become 
as high as 143% of GDP (IMF 2011). Budget deficits in emerging market economies 
and low-income countries were 3.7% and 3% of GDP respectively in 2010 (IMF 
2011). Though average public debt in emerging countries is not very high, it ranges 
from 70% to 80% of GDP in countries like India, Brazil and Hungary. It is argued
(see Fatas 2010; Eichengreen et al. 2011) that this surge in deficit and public debt is 
not solely the result of the recent crisis of 2008, but started much earlier and reflects 
the failure of governments to accumulate enough surpluses in good times.
The renewed interest on macroeconomic imbalance and fiscal consolidation is also 
rooted in their impact on the other parts of the economy. For instance, ‘aggressive 
use of discretionary fiscal policy’ induces macroeconomic instability such as output 
volatility, which in turn reduces economic growth (Fatas and Mihov 2003, p 1440). 
Further, budget deficit can lead towards current account deficit, as suggested by
‘twin deficit’ hypothesis. Bluedorn and Leigh (2011) provide fresh evidence on this 
hypothesis that if budget deficit to GDP decreases by 1% current account balance to 
GDP also decreases by 0.6%. As Fatas (2010, p 2) states, the ‘surge in government 
debt among many OECD countries in recent years is a wake-up call for their 
government to increase fiscal discipline’.
Within the above context, the present paper carries out a systematic and thorough 
empirical analysis on how countries’ de facto or actual exchange rate regime choices 
affect fiscal policy outcomes. In doing so, this study, for the first time in the related 
literature, disentangles both the direct and some of the interaction effects of the 
regime choice on fiscal discipline. Our focus on the interaction effects of regime 
choice is motivated by inconclusive picture offered by prior empirical studies
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regarding the direct effect of exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline (see El-
Shagi 2011; Fatas and Rose 2001; Hamann 2001; Tornell and Velasco 2000). One 
reason for this inconclusiveness may be that the studies generally ignore the fact that 
an exchange rate regime’s effect on fiscal outcomes may depend critically on the 
levels of other theoretically important variable(s). 
Consequently, this study aims to investigate the critical joint role of two important 
determinants of fiscal discipline in moderating the effect of exchange rate regime 
choice: trade openness and central bank independence (CBI). The findings of this 
study can inform countries of their appropriate choice of exchange rate regime that 
is commensurate with their current levels of trade openness and CBI for maintaining 
fiscal discipline.
There are good reasons to believe that central macroeconomic policy choices and 
fiscal outcomes can be shaped by trade openness. Focusing on the role of higher 
trade openness on budget balance, Combes and Saadi-Sedik (2006) argue that higher 
openness may reduce rent-seeking opportunity in a country and thus can improve 
budget balance. They further argue that higher trade openness, by increasing 
inequality, may deteriorate government budget balance. Rodrik (1998) and Cameron 
(1978) discuss the direct effect of trade openness on government size. They suggest 
the important role of government expenditure as a mitigating factor in higher 
external risk resulting from higher trade openness. There are also compelling 
arguments that higher trade openness can determine directly the level of exchange 
rate regime choice. For example, exchange rate fluctuations may be costly for highly 
open economies where trade and investment becomes crucial (Corden 2002). As a 
result, when countries become more and more open, they should move towards fixed 
regimes. Alternatively, higher openness can make countries more vulnerable to real 
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shocks and thus can make flexible regimes more attractive (Magud 2010). The net 
effect is an empirical question.
As to CBI, which has exhibited a significant improvement across the world since the 
1980s (Cukierman 2008; Crowe and Meade 2008), it is often argued that an 
independent central bank keen on maintaining price stability should resist the 
pressure of monetising government budget deficit. As a result, a truly independent 
central bank can bring more fiscal discipline by resisting the government’s 
temptation to generate persistent budget deficit (see Sikken and de Haan 1998). 
Conversely, international political economy literature considers fixed exchange rate 
regimes and independent central banks as two institutional arrangements to achieve 
price stability (see Bodea 2010; Bearce 2008; Bernhard, Broz and Clark 2002). The 
literature also suggests that these two institutions can be complementary or 
substitute to each other. In the former case, higher CBI will result in more flexible 
regimes, while in the latter case, higher CBI will mean fixed regimes.
From the above arguments, it is clear that apart from their direct effect, both trade 
openness and CBI can moderate the effect of exchange rate regimes on fiscal 
outcomes. In fact, it can be readily seen from figures 1a to 1c and 2a to 2c that the 
relationship between budget deficit and exchange rate regimes varies significantly,
depending on the levels of trade openness and CBI, and suggest the possibility of an
interaction effect between the two variables and the exchange rate regime.
Therefore, one testable hypothesis would be how the interaction effect of exchange 
rate regime and trade openness affects fiscal discipline. The second hypothesis 
would be if there is any effect coming from the interaction between exchange rate 
regime and CBI. This study tests the hypotheses by applying formal econometric 
techniques.
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More specific contributions of this study are as follows. First, unlike many other 
studies which confine exchange rate regime choice to fixed and flexible regime 
dichotomy, this study uses the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) ‘fine’ exchange rate regime 
classification, which distinguishes as many as 14 categories of exchange rate 
regimes. The categories are ordered on a scale of 1 to 14, where 1 refers to the least 
flexible and 14 refers to the most flexible regime. Using this index, this study 
examines whether an exchange rate regime’s effect on fiscal policy depends on the 
level of trade openness and CBI. To account for the effect of these channels’
interaction, exchange rate regime and CBI and trade openness enter non-linearly in 
our empirical model. Second, in contrast to several other studies, we consider six 
fiscal policy related variables, which allows us to comprehensively check the 
robustness of our findings.42 These variables are overall budget balance, primary 
budget balance, cash surplus, total government expenditure, primary government 
expenditure and government consumption expenditure. Third, with some exceptions
(such as Fatas and Rose 2001), previous empirical studies confine themselves to a 
small group of countries (for example, Sub-Saharan African or Caribbean countries), 
which may result in sample selection bias. This study, in contrast, explores a large 
number of countries’ most recent panel dataset. Finally, unlike many other studies 
where endogeneity of exchange rate regimes has not been directly tackled, this study 
addresses the possible endogeneity problem by instrumental variables (IV)
estimation and system GMM techniques. 
To preview our findings, the results show significant and robust evidence to the 
hypothesis that the effect of the exchange rate choice on fiscal variables depends 
critically on the level of a country’s trade openness. There is a threshold level of 
42 Except for Fatas and Rose (2001), all empirical studies examine the effect of 
regime choice on one or two fiscal variables.
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trade openness, below which a fixed regime provides fiscal discipline and above the 
threshold, a flexible regime has a disciplinary effect. This finding has important 
policy implications. For instance, based on our result, Brazil, a relatively low open 
economy, would likely to improve its overall budget balance to Columbia or Sri 
Lanka’s level if it moves from its current flexible regime to a more fixed one.
Conversely, budget balance of a highly open economy like Singapore may
deteriorate to Australia’s level if the country abandons the current flexible regime
and embraces a fixed regime. We do not find evidence for our second hypothesis 
that there is any interaction effect between central bank independence and regime 
choice to affect fiscal outcomes. There is also little evidence that the central bank 
independence directly influences any fiscal outcome variables. The above findings 
remain robust across different measures of fiscal outcomes, and in presence of a
number of controls, which include country specific recession dummy, the level of 
development, institutional quality and capital account openness.
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 4.2 outlines the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature. The empirical methodology is described in 
section 4.3, which includes data sources and descriptions, model specifications and 
estimation methods. Section 4.4 contains detailed discussion of results. Section 4.5
concludes. All tables and figures are reported at the end of the paper. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Theoretical literature
Theoretically, the direct effect of exchange rate regimes on fiscal policy is at best 
ambiguous. The conventional idea is that a fixed exchange rate regime provides 
more fiscal discipline; that is, it lowers budget deficit (see, inter alia, Aghevli, Khan 
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and Montiel 1991; Frenkel and Goldstein 1988; Chari and Kehoe 2008 and 
Duttagupta and Tolosa 2006). This notion can be traced back to Keynes (1923, p 
188), who perceives the ‘Gold Standard’, a form of fixed exchange rate, as a 
mechanism to ‘strap down Ministers of Finance’. The reason is that finance 
ministers are generally prone to generating budget deficits. However, the Gold 
Standard (or any metallic standard) limits the ability of central banks to monetise
government budget deficits (see Corden 2002), and thus can maintain fiscal 
discipline.
The extant studies point to various channels through which exchange rate can 
influence fiscal outcome. For example, fixed exchange rate can be treated as a 
credible promise from the government. The fiscal policy should be commensurate to 
fulfil this commitment. A chronic fiscal deficit resulting from imprudent fiscal 
policy will lead to high domestic inflation and reserve loss if deficit is monetised. 
Budget deficit can be inflationary, even if a government finances it by issuing 
nominal bonds, which are not indexed to price level (Leeper and Walker 2012).
In the event of high domestic inflation, the real exchange rate will appreciate if a
fixed exchange rate is maintained. This will result in a loss of competitiveness and a
higher trade deficit. To maintain competitiveness, the devaluation of a currency is an 
option. This means breaking the fixed exchange rate promise, which can be 
economically costly (see Frankel 2005). Further, the public can easily monitor 
exchange rate change and detect a ‘broken promise’ (Canavan and Tommasi 1997). 
The breakdown of peg may be politically costly for the governments as well.43 It is 
argued that the economic and political costs of deficit-induced domestic inflation 
should induce the government or fiscal authority to refrain from pursuing lax fiscal 
43 See Edwards and Santaella (1993) for evidence on these costs.
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policy. Hefeker (2010) develops a model to show that credibly fixed exchange rates
in a low inflation country can reduce corruption and improve the fiscal system,
because low inflation will result in lower seigniorage revenue, which will induce a
country to fight against corruption and the looting of the budget.
Conversely, Tornell and Velasco (1995; 2000) and Sun (2003) refute the 
conventional view by arguing that lax fiscal behaviour involves costs both under 
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, but inter-temporal distribution of these 
costs is different under alternative exchange rate regimes. They argue that under
fixed regimes, lax fiscal policies result in declining reserves or soaring debts which
will punish the policy makers when the situation becomes unsustainable in the 
future. Conversely, flexible regimes let the consequences of imprudent fiscal 
policies to manifest themselves instantly through fluctuations in the exchange rate 
and the price level. The conclusion of their arguments is that ‘if inflation is costly 
for the fiscal authorities, then flexible rates, by forcing the costs to be paid up-front,
can provide more fiscal discipline’ (Tornell and Velasco 1995, p 401).
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) and Fatas and Rose (2001) point to another channel 
through which fiscal policy and exchange rate regimes can be related. Their 
argument is that under fixed exchange rate regimes and high capital mobility,
monetary policy becomes ineffective as a stabilisation tool. Consequently, fiscal 
policy has to shoulder the entire burden of macroeconomic stabilisation, the 
implication of which is that fiscal policy has to be larger and more responsive to 
business cycles under a fixed regime. From the above discussion, it is clear that at 
the theoretical level there is no consensus as to which exchange rate provides more 
fiscal discipline and in which way.
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4.2.1.1 Trade openness, exchange rate regime and fiscal policy
This section focuses on the direct effect of trade openness on fiscal policy outcomes. 
Combes and Saadi-Sedik (2006) show several channels through which trade 
openness may affect budget balance, but conclude that the direction of trade 
openness’s effect on budget balance is ambiguous.44 First, higher openness by 
ensuring higher competition in the product markets may result in lower rent-seeking 
or corruption, which in turn may result in higher budget balance. Second, higher 
openness increases inequality, which increases the demand for public goods, but 
reduces a government’s ability to collect taxes and ultimately results in a higher 
budget deficit. They also point to the exposure of highly open country to external 
shocks in affecting budget balance. Rodrik (1998) and Cameron (1978) posit that 
higher trade openness results in larger government size, which can lead to larger 
budget deficit. Rodrik (1998) opines that more open countries are vulnerable to 
higher external shocks or risks, and higher government expenditure can mitigate the 
risk by providing more social insurance. 
The interaction effect between trade openness and exchange rate regime choice can 
be justified from the theoretical argument that higher trade openness can 
significantly influence exchange rate regime choice.45 For example, Corden (2002) 
argues that, in a highly open economy, exchange rate fluctuations, by affecting trade 
and capital movement, will exert a larger negative effect. To avoid this negative 
effect, countries would prefer to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes. On the other 
hand, Magud (2010) hypothesises that flexible exchange rate regimes can act as a 
44 However, in the empirical section of the paper, Combes and Saadi-Sedik (2006) find that 
higher openness increases budget deficit.
45There appears to be a possible feedback from the exchange rate regime choice on the level 
of trade openness. For example, a fixed exchange regime made by keeping the exchange 
rate stable and thus reducing the uncertainty and transaction costs induces higher trade (see 
Frankel and Rose 2002; Qureshi and Tsangarides 2012). 
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shock absorber in a sufficiently open economy facing real shocks and flexible
regimes should be preferable for this economy. In these ways, higher trade openness 
could most definitely affect the exchange rate regime choice, though the direction of 
the effect is ambiguous. The researcher can argue that higher trade openness, by 
affecting exchange rate regime choice, can moderate the latter’s effect on fiscal 
outcomes. If trade openness restrains countries’ exchange rate regime choices, then 
higher openness would weaken the disciplinary effect of an exchange rate regime.
4.2.1.2 Central bank independence, exchange rate regime and fiscal policy
The direct effect of the central bank independence (CBI) on fiscal discipline is likely 
to work in the following way. A highly independent central bank would resist the 
propensity to monetise extravagant government expenditure, thus bringing in more 
fiscal discipline. An independent central bank, by affecting the rate of growth of 
money and credit, can influence other macroeconomic variables, such as inflation 
and budget deficit (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992). Sargent and Wallace 
(1981) argue that if fiscal policy dominates monetary policy, a monetary authority 
may be forced to monetise a budget deficit that cannot be fully financed by issuing 
bonds. It follows from this argument that an independent central bank, to achieve its 
price level stability objective, may be reluctant to monetise government deficit. This 
is likely to make governments more cautious in pursuing lax fiscal policy (Sikken 
and de Haan 1998). This argument is especially true for developing countries, where 
the possibility of financing a government deficit by selling bonds is limited (Sikken 
and de Haan 1998).
The interaction effect between CBI and exchange rate regime choice follows from 
international political economy literature, which stresses the association between 
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CBI and fixed exchange rate regimes. This literature considers fixed exchange rate 
regimes and independent central banks as two institutional arrangements to achieve 
price stability (see Bodea 2010; Bearce 2008; Bernhard, Broz and Clark 2002). 
These studies also suggest that the above two institutions can be complementary or 
substitute to each other. In the complementarity case, one institution reinforces the 
other, while in the latter one institution obviates the need for the other. Berger,
Sturm and de Haan (2000) argue that an independent central bank will result in 
lower inflationary bias, which will lower the credibility gain from a pegged 
exchange rate. Thus, higher CBI may lead towards flexible regimes. Frieden, Ghezzi
and Stein (2000) argue that an independent central bank may want to tie its hands by 
adopting a peg regime so that it can pursue its price stability objective. On the 
contrary, Bodea (2010) claims that if there are imperfections in these institutions, in 
the sense that fixed exchange rates are adjustable or CBI lack transparency, then 
both fixed regimes and independent central banks can be chosen. The above 
arguments suggest the possibility that higher CBI can determine the level of an 
exchange rate regime, which in turn will affect fiscal outcomes. However, the 
direction of the effect is ambiguous.
4.2.2 Empirical literature
In this section, we discuss some of the empirical studies that examine the correlation 
between fiscal variables and exchange rate regime. Tornell and Velasco (2000) 
analyse data for 25 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries to test their theoretical 
idea that flexible but not fixed regimes provide more fiscal discipline. The positive 
signs of the coefficients of the dummies representing exchange rate regime choice 
suggest that a flexible regime provides more fiscal discipline. However, the 
coefficients remain largely insignificant across different time periods.
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Fatas and Rose (2001) examines the effect of exchange rate regime choice on a 
number of fiscal policy related variables, such as total government expenditure,
current revenue, overall budget surplus, general government consumption and tax 
revenue. It also considers disaggregated measures of revenue and expenditure. Fatas
and Rose (2001) use a panel dataset covering the period 1960 to 1998 for a large 
number of countries. The estimation method used is ordinary least squares (OLS),
including time dummies. However, this study considers dummies for only hard peg,
ignoring other fixed regimes, and finds that while a currency board arrangement 
provides some fiscal discipline, currency union and dollarisation do not. 
Endogeneity of exchange rate regime has not been accounted for directly.
Duttagupta and Tolosa (2006) examine free-riding behaviour under fixed and 
flexible regimes in 15 Caribbean countries. They find that fiscal balance is worse in 
countries with a fixed regime. They use lag values of controls to avoid endogeneity,
but consider regime choice to be exogenous. Kim (2003) finds little evidence that 
exchange rate regime has any significant effect on budget deficit. Hamann (2001) 
does not find evidence that a fixed regime provides more fiscal discipline.
El-Shagi (2011) concentrates on the disciplinary effect of exchange rate regime 
choices for more than 100 countries from 1975 to 2004. The study is confined only 
to government indebtedness measured by the change in the ratio of government debt 
to GDP. Unlike other studies, El-Shagi (2011) includes current as well as lagged
regime choices; the latter cover the possibility that the final effects of changing 
regimes on debt do not manifest immediately. By using a least-square dummy 
variable (LSDV) method and dynamic panel with a two-step system GMM, this 
study finds that new debt initially decreases when a pegged is introduced, but returns
to the original level over time. Aside from being confined to only new indebtedness,
this study only examines the direct effect of regime choice on new indebtedness. In 
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so doing, it considers regime choice in arbitrarily chosen fixed versus flexible 
settings.
The existing empirical studies generally suffer from a number of shortcomings. 
First, they focus exclusively on the direct effect of regime choice on fiscal 
outcomes. Second, the findings of these studies are not conclusive and robust. Third,
no previous work considers the possibility that trade openness and central bank 
independence can moderate the effect of exchange rate regime choices in affecting 
fiscal outcomes.
4.3 Data and methodology
4.3.1 Data
We employ two datasets for fiscal policy related variables. The first dataset is from 
the government finance statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and covers the period 1971 to 2000 for 97 developed and developing countries. This 
dataset provides observations on overall budget balance, primary budget balance, as 
well as total and primary government expenditure.46 Government cash surplus,
which is similar to the overall budget balance but is not directly comparable, is also 
used as another indicator of fiscal policy variable. The cash surplus data are from 
1971 to 2007.47 The second data source is the world development indicator (WDI). 
WDI provides the indicator for government size, which is proxied by the 
government consumption expenditure. We have data for 126 countries for the period 
1971 to 2007. All variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP.
46 These fiscal policy related variables are constructed according to the GFS 1986 manual. 
We use this dataset because it provides data for a wide range of fiscal policy related 
variables for a large number of countries. 
47 Current GFS database reports data on fiscal variables according to the GFS 2001 manual. 
However, the database provides fiscal balance data for a few countries for a few years. 
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Exchange rate regime choice is the main explanatory variable, which is proxied by 
the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de facto exchange rate classification index. The 
index has 14 categories arranged from the least flexible to the most flexible regimes. 
Higher values of this index indicate more flexible regimes. We use two measures for 
Central Bank Independence. First is the central bank governor turnover rate (TOR),
which reflects de facto CBI (see Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992) and is 
commonly used in empirical studies regarding CBI. The higher TOR indicates a
lower CBI. Yearly data for the actual number of governor turnover are obtained 
from Dreher, Sturm and de Haan (2008). TOR for the five-year period has been 
calculated as the total number of governor change in a five-year period divided by 
five. Second, we also use another measure, the legal CBI index. This measure was 
first constructed by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (CWN) in 1992 on a decade 
basis, and has values between 0 and 1—higher values indicate higher CBI. Polillo 
and Guillen (2005) have extended the CWN index up to 2000 on an annual basis for 
more than 90 countries. Crowe and Meade (2008) further extend the CWN index up 
to 2003. Trade openness is measured by export plus import as a percentage of GDP. 
Data for this variable are obtained from the Penn World Table version 6.3.
Now we turn to the controls which are assumed to have a direct effect on fiscal 
discipline, and are commonly used in the literature.   We use two proxies separately 
to account for the effect of cyclical behaviour of the economy on fiscal policy. First,
a country specific recession dummy is generated using the method proposed by 
Bruckner and Ciccone (2011). Second, the output gap is calculated based on log real 
GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. The calculated output gap is a 
continuous variable with higher values indicating better economic performance. It is 
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expected that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical,48 that is, during a recession,
government expenditure will tend to increase and revenue decrease resulting in a
higher budget deficit. We use a log of per capita GDP as a proxy for a country’s 
level of development. One would expect that more developed countries with better 
fiscal and other institutions, in general, would be capable of limiting their budget 
deficit.
Good governance or institutional factors are also important determinants of budget 
deficit and can maintain fiscal discipline (Woo 2003; Abiad and Baig 2005). The 
Polity2 variable from the Polity IV database has been used as a proxy for 
institutional quality. A country’s level of development and CBI may also capture the 
institutional factors. Capital account openness may impose a discipline on 
government in pursuing fiscal policy because ‘the prospect of rising interest rate and 
capital flight may discourage larger public sector deficit’ (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004,
p 9). This variable is measured by a capital account openness index proposed by 
Chinn and Ito (2008). This index takes the values 0 to 1, where higher values 
indicate more open capital account. A complete list of all variables, definitions of 
the variables and data sources is in Table 1.
4.3.2 Model specification
Based on the theoretical discussions, we specify the following empirical model:
௜ܻ௧ =  ߚ଴ +  ߚଵܴ݁݃݅݉݁௜௧ + ߚଶܥܤܫ௜௧ +  ߚଷܴ݁݃݅݉݁௜௧ כ ܥܤܫ௜௧ +  ߚସܱ݌݁݊௜௧ +
 ߚହܴ݁݃݅݉݁௜௧ כ ܱ݌݁݊௜௧ +  ߜܺ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧ … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . (1)
48 Some studies observe that fiscal policy can be pro-cyclical in developing countries (see
Alesina, Tabellini and Campante 2008).
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௜ܻ௧ is fiscal policy related variables, Regime is exchange rate regime choice, as 
measured by the Reinhart-Rogoff flexibility index, CBI is an indicator of CBI and
Open refers to trade openness. We are particularly interested in the interaction 
effects, i.e., the interaction between regime choice and CBI and interaction between 
regime choice and trade openness. Regime choice is the ‘focal independent variable’ 
and trade openness and CBI are ‘moderator variables’ in the model. The interaction 
effects will capture how a regime choice’s effect on fiscal variables depends on the 
level of CBI and level of trade openness. ܺ௜௧ is a vector of other controls, which
have a direct effect on fiscal outcomes (see, section 4.3.1). ߝ௜௧ is the error term,
which follows the standard Gaussian assumptions.
The expected signs of the coefficients, as discussed in the theoretical section, are 
ambiguous in most of the cases. Moreover, the signs will be different depending on 
the type of fiscal variables considered (budget balance or government expenditure). 
If a government budget balance is the dependent variable and if conventional view 
holds (that is, that fixed regimes provide more fiscal discipline), one would expect 
ߚଵ   < 0 , indicating an improvement of the budget balance with fixed regimes. 
Alternatively, ߚଵ >0 if the non-conventional view holds, in which case flexible 
regimes are associated with improved budget balance. If the government 
expenditure related variables are the dependent variables, then ߚଵ  > 0 for a
conventional view and ߚଵ  < 0  for a non-conventional view. The sign of ߚଶ is 
expected to be positive as higher CBI is expected to provide more fiscal discipline.
However, if expenditure is the dependent variable, ߚଶ is likely to be negative. 
Similarly, the sign of ߚସ , which depicts the direct effect of openness on budget 
balance is theoretically ambiguous. The expected signs of the coefficients of the two 
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interaction terms (ߚଷ and ߚହ ) are also ambiguous in the theory. Their expected 
signs ultimately become an empirical question.
It must be noted that in a model with interaction term(s), the significance of the 
point estimates of the coefficient(s) are not directly relevant. Rather, the focus 
should be on the marginal effect of the focal explanatory variable (Greene 2003). 
Therefore, we are particularly interested in the marginal effect of exchange rate 
regime choice on fiscal outcomes, which will depend on the level of CBI and trade 
openness and can be written as follows:
Marginal effect of regime choice =  Ⱦଵ +  Ⱦଷ כ CBI + Ⱦହ כ  Open
The marginal effects of regime choice can be calculated at different values of CBI,
while keeping openness at its mean value. The standard error of each marginal effect 
can be calculated and the significance of each marginal effect can be examined by 
constructing upper and lower bounds for a confidence interval. Finally, all marginal 
effects, along with their confidence interval, can be presented in a graph. The 
marginal effects of regime choice at different values of trade openness can also be 
evaluated in a similar manner.
4.3.3 Estimation method
In estimating equation 1, we treat regime choice with 14 distinct categories as a 
continuous variable. This can be justified in the following way. Very often, 
countries choose a set of exchange rate arrangements among a continuum of policy 
choices to make up their exchange rate regimes. The de facto classification of 
Reinhart-Rogoff categorises this spectrum into 14 groups. If two countries differ 
only slightly in their exchange rate arrangements, they are likely to be allocated into 
the same group. To be allocated into different groups, they must have made 
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sufficiently different policy choices. The question in this case is whether these 14 
groups are ordinal variables, or continuous variables rounded to integers. Even if 
one views these categories as ordinal, 14 different regimes make the underlying 
categorisation almost indistinguishable from continuous measures.49
4.3.3.1 Pooled OLS   
The fixed effect estimation of equation 1 will provide insignificant estimates, 
because one of the important explanatory variables in the equation—the CBI—
changes very little overtime for all countries. Therefore, the equation is estimated by 
pooled OLS using year dummies (common time effects), which capture common 
shocks for all countries. Country-specific time trends are also included to control for 
the time-trending behaviour of both dependent and explanatory variables. In this 
way, the estimated coefficients capture the effects of explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable outside their long-term trending relationship. In other words, our 
model captures the deviations from long-run trends of both explanatory and 
dependent variables, which, being a restrictive specification, is likely to take us 
away from pure correlations towards more reliable relationships. The standard errors 
are clustered at the country level.  
Though few empirical studies on exchange rate regime choice have considered fiscal 
outcomes as possible determinants of regime choice, endogeneity resulting from 
reverse causation from fiscal outcome to exchange rate regime choice may be a 
concern. The reverse causality may arise, for example, if a country experiencing a
higher budget deficit adopts a particular exchange rate regime to ensure the fiscal 
49 Aghion et al. (2009) adopt the RR ‘coarse’ classification of exchange rate regimes with 
five categories and treat it as a continuous variable. Further, several other measures in the 
literature which are constructed in a similar way are treated as continuous. For instance, 
Polity IV indicators, Freedom House political rights and civil liberties measures, and 
corruption index are often used as explanatory variables on the right-hand side.
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discipline that the regime will provide. Trade openness may be endogenous as well 
(see Rodrik 1998). Endogeneity of CBI and institutional quality is less of a concern 
because these variables change very little over time. Controls such as capital account 
openness may also be endogenous (see Kim 2003). In order to tackle the
endogeneity problem, one period lag of all explanatory and control variables (except 
that of the recession dummy) are used in estimating equation 1. Pooled OLS is thus 
our benchmark specification.
It can be argued, however, that taking one period lag of endogenous variables is not 
a proper way of correcting endogeneity. We, therefore, check whether our 
benchmark results change if endogeneity is corrected with more formal techniques 
described below.
4.3.3.2 Identification and IV estimation
The following three methods are used for further endogeneity correction. First,
equation 1 is estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS), where either first or 
second lags of the main endogenous explanatory variables (regime choice and 
openness) are used as instruments. Other variables enter directly with a lag. Second,
we resort to an instrumental variable estimation technique using external instruments 
for exchange rate regime choice. Finding suitable variables, which will fulfil all the 
necessary conditions to be valid instruments for exchange rate regime, is a difficult 
task. This is because the determinants of an exchange rate regime choice may also 
directly affect fiscal outcomes and thus will violate the exclusion principle of good 
instruments. For example, Aghion et al. (2009) use an institutional variable as an 
instrument of exchange rate regime while examining the effect of regime choice on 
labour productivity. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), while examining the 
effect of regime choice on growth, propose a number of exogenous variables, such 
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as the geographical area of the country, the proportion of a country’s GDP to US 
GDP, an island dummy and the average exchange rate indicator of a country’s 
neighbours (reflecting regional exchange rate indicators) as instruments for regime 
choice. Similarly, Harms and Kretschmann (2009) use land area, a major oil 
exporter dummy, central bank TOR and a variable related to political and 
institutional instability. As mentioned earlier, most of these instruments are unlikely 
to comply with the exclusion restriction principle in the present paper’s context. One 
exogenous variable proposed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)—the average 
exchange rate indicator of a country’s neighbours or the regional exchange rate 
indicator—can fulfil the exclusion restriction principle. ‘The regional exchange rate 
may indicate explicit or implicit exchange rate coordination with countries that 
typically share strong trade links, as the trade literature has profusely illustrated 
through the use of gravity models’ (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2003, p 1185). 
This single instrument, though relevant and exogenous, might explain very little of 
the complex issue of exchange rate regime choice. Consequently, this variable alone 
is likely to make a weak instrument in our estimation.50 Nonetheless, the model is 
estimated with this single IV using the limited information maximum likelihood 
(LIML) method, which is robust to weak instrument. To fulfil exclusion restriction,
we control for other variables such as trade with neighbours and a neighbours’ size-
weighted institutional quality in the second stage. Finally, we estimate the dynamic 
version of equation 1 by the system GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998). This method allows us to use internal instruments to 
account for endogeneity (see El-Shagi 2011). Sargan/Hansen test is used to check 
the validity of the internal instruments.
50 In general, the coefficient of this instrument in the first stage is positive and significant at 
1% level. With this instrument, our model is not under-identified as suggested by the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test. First stage F-statistics of the excluded instrument is about 
eight, giving evidence that the instrument is rather weak.
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4.3.3.3 Robustness analysis
In order to check robustness of the benchmark results, equation 1 is also estimated 
after omitting observations by regions, which accounts for the unobserved 
characteristics of the omitted regions and mitigates endogeneity due to omitted 
factors. In this connection, we have categorised countries into eight regions,
including East Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
Western Europe and North America and the Caribbean. As further robustness check 
the equation is estimated by OLS including region dummies to capture regional 
fixed effects and region specific time trends. Regional dummies are likely to capture 
the structural characteristics related to geographical location (Woo 2003). Further, 
exchange rate choice varies widely across regions.51 For example, oil exporting 
Middle Eastern countries follows fixed regimes, some African countries pegged 
their currency to their former colonial ruler, some Caribbean countries form 
currency board, and Latin American countries have experimented with different 
exchange rate regimes.
Common time effects are also included in all regressions to account for common 
shocks. 
4.4 Results and discussion
In this section we discuss the estimation results of equation 1. The signs and 
magnitude of the coefficients of the main explanatory variables vary regarding the 
choice of dependent variables. First, we discuss the results when dependent 
variables are related to budget balance (that is, overall budget balance, primary 
51 We have elaborated this in Table 3.
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budget balance and cash surplus) in tables 4 to 8. Then we discuss findings when the 
dependent variables are related to government expenditure, such as total 
expenditure, primary expenditure and consumption expenditure (see Tables 9 and 
10). In each case, we discuss only the coefficients of the main explanatory variables 
and interaction terms.
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In this section we explore the potential direct and indirect links between fiscal 
variables and main explanatory variables (exchange rate regime choice, trade 
openness and CBI) and interaction effects by examining descriptive statistics and 
scatter plots.
First, we present the average budget balance and other fiscal policy related variables 
across different exchange rate regimes, levels of trade openness and CBI. Table 2 
shows that the average overall budget balance is worst for flexible regimes (-4.89%
of GDP) followed by intermediate regimes. Budget balance is relatively better (-
3.38% of GDP) under fixed regimes. The same trend is observed for primary budget 
balance and cash surplus. Conversely, government expenditure (total government 
expenditure, primary expenditure and consumption expenditure) is higher under 
fixed regimes than flexible regimes. This opposite behaviour of budget balance and 
government expenditure under an alternative exchange rate is consistent with the 
ambiguous direct effect of regime choice on fiscal outcomes.
Columns 4 to 6 in Table 2 show that average budget balances, as well as a cash 
surplus position, is better for highly open countries as compared to low open 
countries. However, average expenditure is consistently higher for highly open 
countries. Part three of Table 2 shows that, consistent with the theory, low central 
128
bank governor TOR (which corresponds to a high CBI) is associated with better 
budget balance. Again, expenditure behaviour is not consistent with the theory.
Table 3 outlines considerable differences regarding budget balance across different 
regions of the world. Overall budget balance, primary balance and cash surplus are 
worse in the South Asia region, followed by Sub-Saharan African countries.52 The 
table also shows the wide variation in exchange rate regime choices across regions. 
It can also be noted that two regions with the worst budget balance are also the 
regions following relatively fixed regimes.
In order to explore the possible interactions between regime choice and trade 
openness on overall budget balance, we plot overall budget balance against regime 
choice for observations pertaining to lower, two middles and upper quartiles of trade 
openness. These plots are shown in figures 1a to 1c. It is observed that, depending 
on the level of trade openness, the relationship between budget balance and regime 
choice varies significantly, suggesting the possibility of an interaction effect. At a
low level of openness the relationship is negative, while at high openness the 
relationship appears to be positive. At a medium level of trade openness the 
relationship is rather weak. A similar relationship between primary budget balance 
and regime choice prevails at different levels of trade openness. Similarly, figures 2a 
to 2c plot budget deficit and regime choice at lower, middle and upper quartiles of 
central bank governor TOR. The figures again reveal possible interaction effects
between budget balance and regime choice. We wish to establish this link more 
formally by using the econometric techniques outlined previously.
52 A list of all regions is in the previous section.
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4.4.2 Overall budget balance
Table 4 presents the benchmark OLS regression results of equation 1 with the 
overall budget balance as the dependent variable. Column 1 shows the regression 
results including common time effect (year dummies) but excluding controls. It can 
be seen that the direct effect of a regime choice enters with a negative coefficient 
and is significant at 5% level. The interaction between regime choice and trade 
openness enters with a positive coefficient and is highly significant at 1% level,
suggesting that a regime choice’s effect on budget balance depends on the level of 
trade openness. The direct effect of trade openness is insignificant with a negative 
coefficient. CBI, as measured by the central bank governor TOR, enters with a 
positive coefficient, contrary to our expectation. However, the coefficient is not 
significant. Interaction between regime choice and TOR is not significant either,
reflecting the possibility that there may not be an interaction effect between TOR 
and regime choice to affect budget balance.53 The inclusion of country specific time 
trends in the column 1 regression makes direct effect of regime choice insignificant,
though the coefficient maintains its negative sign (see column 2). The interaction 
between regime choice and trade openness remains significant at 5% level. This 
gives strong evidence that trade openness affects budget balance through regime 
choice. Other explanatory variables remain insignificant as before.
Columns 3 to 7 in Table 4 present regression results by including one control at a 
time alongside the main explanatory variables and interaction terms. The controls 
are country specific recession dummy (see column 3), output gap (see column 4),
institutional quality related variable (see column 5), level of development (see 
column 6) and capital account openness (see column 7). In each regression,
53 If this interaction effect is not really significant, it may distort the direct effects. We 
explore this issue later.
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interaction terms between regime choice and trade openness always enter 
significantly at 5% or better levels. Conversely, interaction between regime choice
and TOR is largely insignificant, except for columns 3 and 4 when it remains 
significant only marginally (at 10%). Finally, column 8 reports the full model, which
includes three controls—recession dummy, level of development and capital account 
openness. The output gap is excluded because it is a similar measure of cyclical 
behaviour of economy as a recession dummy. Institutional quality (polity) is also 
excluded because its inclusion reduces the sample size and it is likely to be highly 
correlated with the level of development. This model shows that the coefficient of 
interaction between regime choice and trade openness is still positive and remains 
significant at 1% level. Regime choice enters with a negative coefficient and is 
significant at 5% level. Trade openness, which was insignificant before, becomes 
marginally significant as well and its coefficient is negative. None of the coefficients
of TOR and the interaction between regime choice and TOR remain significant in 
this full model. 
The negative coefficients of regime choice in columns 1 to 8 in Table 4 signal that 
as countries move towards fixed (flexible) regimes, budget balance improves 
(deteriorates). This finding provides some support to the traditional view that fixed 
regimes are associated with better fiscal discipline. However, the significant and 
positive coefficient of interaction term between regime choice and trade openness 
suggests that this disciplinary effect of fixed regime depends critically on the levels 
of trade openness. To elaborate, at a higher level of openness, the disciplinary effect 
of fixed regimes will be weakened and at a very high level of openness, flexible 
regimes may be disciplinary. This can be justified by Magud (2010) argument that at 
very high level of openness flexible regimes have more shock absorption capacity. 
Flexible exchange rates thus will obviate the need for higher government 
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expenditure required for mitigating the effects shocks resulting from higher 
openness. 
Significant point estimates in columns 1 to 8 show strong evidence of an interaction 
effect between regime choice and trade openness, but little evidence of the existence 
of an interaction effect between regime choice and TOR. In a model with interaction 
term(s), the direct effect of explanatory variable(s) on a dependent variable is less 
relevant because the marginal effect of the focal explanatory variable depends on the 
level of moderator variable(s). Therefore, it may be possible that marginal effects of 
regime choice on budget balance may be significant for some values of TOR or 
trade openness. In order to investigate this possibility, we calculate the marginal 
effects of regime choice for the whole range of trade openness, while keeping TOR 
at its mean value from the full model (column 8). Similarly, we calculate the 
marginal effects of regime choice at different levels of TOR by keeping trade 
openness at its mean.
The marginal effects of regime choice conditional on the levels of trade openness 
are presented in Figure 3. In this figure, the solid horizontal line is the zero line. The 
solid upward line shows the marginal effect of regime choice at different values of 
trade openness. Two dotted lines show the upper and lower bounds of confidence 
interval (CI) for each marginal effect. Marginal effect is significant if both CIs are 
simultaneously above or below the zero line. The figure clearly shows that the 
marginal effects are significant for a large number of values of trade openness. 
Similarly, we present the marginal effects of regime choice conditional on the levels 
of TOR in Figure 4. Unlike the previous graph, it is seen that marginal effect is not 
significant for any values of TOR, which is consistent with our findings from the 
point estimates.
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To confirm the above findings, we re-estimate regressions 1 to 8 in Table 4 with 
another measure of CBI: the legal independence of the central bank. When we use
this measure of CBI, the sample size, both in terms of the number of observations 
and number of countries, drops significantly. Neither legal CBI nor its interaction 
with regime choice is significant in any of the regressions. Nonetheless, in each case 
point estimates of interaction between regime choice and trade openness are 
significant at a 5% or better level. We report only the results from the full model in 
column 9 in Table 4, which corresponds to the results in column 8 in the same table. 
It should be noted that signs of the coefficients of CBI and interaction between CBI 
and regime choice in column 8 and 9 are opposite to each other. These are expected,
given that CBI measured by TOR and legal CBI index are inverse to each other. 
That is, higher values of TOR indicate lower CBI, while higher values of legal CBI 
index indicate higher CBI. We have also calculated the marginal effects of regime 
choice from column 9 and drawn CI graphs corresponding to Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
The graphs also reveal that marginal effects of regime choice are not significant for 
any level of the legal CBI index, but are significant for a large number of values of 
trade openness.
Both point estimates and CI graphs of marginal effects of exchange rate regime 
choice strongly suggest that there is no interaction effect between TOR (or legal 
CBI) and regime choice. Therefore, we estimate column 8 of Table 4, excluding the 
insignificant interaction term.54 This will allow us to estimate the effect of other 
explanatory variables more precisely. Governor TOR is retained because it is an 
important explanatory variable in our model. The results are presented in column 1 
in Table 4a. It is seen that the coefficient of the direct effect of regime choice is now 
54 We choose column 8 instead of column 9 because in the latter case, as mentioned, sample 
size drops significantly.
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larger and significant at better level. The coefficient of trade openness also becomes 
somewhat larger, but its significance level does not change. Magnitude and 
significance of the interaction term do not change. We conduct further endogeneity 
correction and robustness check with this model.
4.4.2.1 Endogeneity correction
In this sub-section we report endogeneity corrected results using 2SLS, LIML and 
system GMM. The objective is to check whether our benchmark results change 
because of endogeneity correction with more formal techniques. We estimate the
full model in column 1 in Table 4a by 2SLS, with the first lag values of main 
explanatory variables as instruments. Controls enter with lag values. The 2SLS 
results are in column 1a in Table 4a, which show that the coefficients of regime 
choice and interaction terms are somewhat larger but remain significant at 1% level. 
The coefficient of openness is significant at a better level (5%) and also becomes 
larger.55 Second, LIML results using the neighbour’s size weighted regime choice as 
an external instrument for regime choice are reported in column 1b. It is seen that 
none of the coefficient is individually significant. However, the signs of the 
coefficients are the same as coefficients of column 1. Third, results estimated by 
system GMM are reported in column 1c in Table 4a. The country specific time trend 
is not included in this regression. The interaction term is significant at a 5% level 
with a positive sign. Regime choice and openness are significant at a 5% and 1%
level, respectively, and enter with the same sign as in column 1. Overall, 2SLS,
LIML and system GMM results broadly support the results of our full model in 
column 1.
55 The use of second lags of explanatory variables as instruments gives similar results.
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4.4.2.2 Robustness check
To check the robustness of the results we estimate the full model in column 1 in 
Table 4a for sub-samples of countries, excluding observations from regions or 
country group. The results are presented in column 1 to 7 in Table 5. Results in each 
column are estimated by excluding countries from one region at a time. Column 1 
and column 2 present results for developing and OECD countries, respectively.
Column 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 exclude countries of SSA, Latin America, Caribbean,
Middle East and North Africa and Eastern Europe, respectively. Except for column 
2, the results are qualitatively similar to those presented in column 1 in Table 4a. 
Regime choice always enters with a negative sign and significant. The interaction 
term is positive and significant at 1% level. In column 2, which presents results for 
OECD countries, explanatory variables enter with the same signs as in other 
regressions in the table, but none of the coefficients is significant. This may be 
because this regression uses a relatively smaller number of countries and 
observations. This may also result from the fact that exchange rate choice variation 
is stronger in developing countries than developed countries.
The last three regressions (columns 8 to 10) in Table 5 show the results of our full 
model, including region fixed effects, region time trends, and common time effects.
Column 8 reports results for all available observations. Column 9 and 10 report 
results with observations from developing and OECD countries, respectively. Again,
results are similar to what were obtained before. Regime choice enters with negative 
coefficient and is significant. The coefficient of interaction term is also highly 
significant with consistent positive signs. The coefficient of trade openness is 
negative, but significant only in columns 8 and 9.
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Overall, we find strong evidence that regime choice has a direct effect on overall 
budget balance. Moreover, it has an interaction effect on overall budget balance 
through trade openness. That is, a regime choice’s effect depends on the level of 
trade openness. Conversely, trade openness has a direct effect on budget deficit, but 
that effect is not robust across different specifications.
4.4.2.3 Marginal effect of exchange rate regime choice on overall budget 
balance
This section examines the marginal effects of regime choice on overall budget 
balance conditional on the level of trade openness only. When interaction between 
regime choice and trade openness is considered, the marginal effect of regime 
choice is as follows:
Marginal effect of regime choice on budget balance = ߚଵ +  ߚହ כ  ܱ݌݁݊.
Results in column 1 in Table 4a are chosen for discussion. In the extreme situation 
when a country does not trade with rest of the world at all (openness is zero), the 
marginal effect of regime choice on budget balance is -0.33. That is, if this country 
moves towards fixed regimes by on unit in the Reinhart-Rogoff flexibility scale, its 
budget balance will improve by 0.33%. If trade openness of this country increases 
from zero to 45% (roughly the twenty-fifth percentile value) the marginal effect 
decreases to -0.11. At the median value of trade openness (about 70%), the marginal
effect of regime choice becomes positive (0.02) and moving towards flexible 
regimes provides more fiscal discipline.
As the signs of the coefficients of regime choice and interaction between regime 
choice and openness are opposite to each other, higher level of openness will 
weaken the effect of regime choice. In this case, the marginal effect of a regime may 
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not be entirely negative or positive, but a threshold level of trade openness may be 
obtained, after which marginal effect may change sign. This is evident from Figure 
5, which shows that at a low level of trade openness (below 61%), the marginal 
effect of regime choice on budget balance is negative. When trade openness is above 
61% of GDP, the marginal effect becomes positive. However, the marginal effect is 
significant, as indicated by the two dotted lines lying simultaneously above or below 
the zero line, when trade openness is equal or below 30% and equal or above 103%.
To make this finding more concrete, we consider the case of Brazil. On average,
Brazil is the least open country in our dataset (15%) and facing a high budget deficit 
(7.5% of GDP) during 1971 to 2000 periods. This country is at the highest end of the 
Reinhart-Rogoff exchange rate regime flexibility index (12), a managed floater. Our 
model predicts that, given its current level of trade openness, if Brazil moves 
towards fixed regimes, its fiscal balance will improve to Columbia or Sri Lanka’s 
level. Conversely, Singapore is the most open country, with average openness above 
300% of GDP during 1971 to 2000 period. The actual regime choice of this country 
is at the floating end of the Reinhart-Rogoff flexibility index (category 11). The 
average overall budget surplus (5.15%) of this country is one of the largest during 
the same period. According to our model, at its current level of openness, if 
Singapore’s actual regime choice becomes less flexible, its budget balance will 
deteriorate to Australia’s level.
4.4.3 Primary budget balance and cash surplus
This section investigates whether the above findings for overall budget balance hold 
for the other two measures of budget balance: primary budget balance and cash 
surplus.
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4.4.3.1 Primary budget balance
We have replicated the regressions in tables 4, 4a and 5 with primary budget balance 
as dependent variable. The results are qualitatively similar to what we have found 
regarding the overall budget balance. For brevity, we report pooled OLS, 2SLS,
LIML and system GMM for the full model only. The results are in the first part of 
Table 6.
Column 1 of Table 6, which corresponds to column 8 in Table 4, reports the OLS 
results when both interaction terms are included. It can be seen that regime choice 
has a significant direct effect, as well as an interaction effect, on trade openness. The 
interaction effect between regime choice and TOR appears non-existent. Relevant 
CI graphs of marginal effects (not reported) also confirm these findings.56
Consequently, we report the OLS results in column 2, excluding the interaction 
between regime choice and TOR. This column shows that signs and significance of 
coefficients are in conformity with Table 4a results. The coefficients of regime 
choice and interaction terms between regime choice and openness are highly 
significant, but coefficients become somewhat smaller. 2SLS results with first lag as 
instruments confirm the sign and significance of the above coefficients as well (see 
column 2a). LIML estimates in column 2b confirm the sign of the coefficients, but 
in contrast to column 1b in Table 4a, the interaction term becomes marginally 
significant. System GMM results in column 2c are also in conformity with previous 
results. The direct effect of trade openness, though entering with a negative 
coefficient, is significant only in column 2a. This gives evidence that trade openness 
affects budget balance mainly through it interaction with regime choice.
56 We have estimated column 1 with legal CBI index as well. Our conclusion on the 
interaction effects does not change.
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4.4.3.2 Robustness check: We estimate regression 2 in Table 6 with sub-samples 
and regional fixed effects and present the results in Table 7. It is seen that the results 
are not driven by any particular regions or group of countries, including OECD 
countries (see columns 1 to 7). Results with a regional fixed effect are similar but 
less robust when we conduct this analysis for developing and developed countries. 
With a developing country sample, interaction term and openness enter significantly,
but regime choice does not. For OECD samples, none of the coefficients is
significant; this is not surprising because variation among the OECD countries is 
likely to be smaller in exchange rate regime, trade openness, and so on.
4.4.3.3 Marginal effects of regime choice on primary budget balance: We have 
calculated the marginal effects of regime choice on primary budget balance 
conditional on the different values of trade openness based on column 2 in Table 6
and presented them in a graph (see Figure 6). The graph is similar to Figure 5. That 
is, the marginal effect is negative (the fixed regime is disciplinary) at a relatively 
low level of trade openness and positive at a higher level of openness. The threshold 
value of trade openness at which marginal effect changes sign is 72%, which is 
somewhat higher than what was obtained from Figure 5. The marginal effect is 
significant when trade openness is lower than 40% or higher than 114%.
4.4.3.4 Cash surplus
This section outlines the results when cash surplus is the dependent variable. The 
results of the full model are presented in the second part of Table 6. With both 
interaction terms, OLS results in column 3 shows that the direct effect of regime 
choice and interaction effect are significant with negative and positive coefficients,
respectively. While direct effect is significant at a 10% level, the interaction effect 
is highly significant at 1% level. Column 4 excludes interaction between regime 
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choice and TOR. In this column, the direct effect of regime choice and its interaction 
with trade openness are still significant but at lower levels. The direct effect of trade 
openness is not significant, as usual. 2SLS results in column 4a are similar to OLS 
results. In contrast, none of the coefficients are significant when LIML and system 
GMM are considered (see columns 4b and 4c). However, the results do confirm the 
signs of the coefficients; that is, a negative coefficient for regime choice and a
positive coefficient for the interaction term. 
4.4.3.5 Robustness check: An analysis with sub-samples, including regional fixed 
effects is shown in Table 8. Again, significant direct and interaction effects of 
regime choice are confirmed in columns 1 to 7. Only in column 4 when Latin 
American countries are omitted direct effect of regime choice is not significant. Of 
course, the interaction effect is significant at 1% level in column 4. Results with 
regional fixed effects presented in columns 8 to 10 broadly confirm our findings.
4.4.3.6 Marginal effects of regime choice on cash surplus: The marginal effects of 
regime choice on cash surplus calculated from column 4 of Table 6 are presented in 
Figure 7. The marginal effects are negative at lower levels of openness, suggesting 
that fixed regimes are better able to provide a higher cash surplus. The effects are 
significant when trade openness levels are 52% of GDP or lower. The magnitude of 
marginal effects becomes positive when trade openness is very high, such as 133%
of GDP. However, as compared to marginal effect of regime choice on overall and 
primary budget balance, the marginal effect on regime choice is not significant at 
higher levels of trade openness.
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4.4.4 Government expenditure
This section shows the results when government expenditure related variables are 
dependent variables. We use three such variables: total government expenditure,
primary expenditure and government consumption expenditure. For each case we 
present two OLS regressions—one with two interaction terms and the other with one 
interaction term. We also present corresponding 2SLS, LIML and system GMM 
results for the latter OLS regression. The results are presented in tables 9 and 10.
First, we consider the results when total government expenditure is the dependent 
variable (see the first part of Table 9). As expected, the signs of the coefficients of 
the main explanatory variables are now opposite to what was found in tables 4 to 8. 
The coefficient of regime choice is now positive and significant in all cases except 
for LIML results. Taken alone, the positive sign of the coefficient implies that 
moving towards fixed regimes results in lower government expenditure; that is,
disciplining government expenditure. The sign of the interaction term between 
regime and openness is negative and significant in all cases except LIML. This 
implies that at a higher level of trade openness, the direct disciplinary effect will be 
weaker. The trade openness variable also remains significant, with a positive 
coefficient implying that higher openness alone will result in higher government 
expenditure. Similar patterns are observed when dependent variables are primary 
budget balance (see the second part of Table 9) and government consumption 
expenditure (see Table 10). It is seen that the coefficient of TOR is significant with a 
negative coefficient in some cases, but its sign is contrary to our expectations.57
57 We estimate the full model with one interaction term for three government expenditure 
related variables for sub-samples and with regional fixed effects. The results, not presented 
here, are highly consistent with the results in tables 9 and 10. However, the inclusion of 
regional fixed effects makes TOR insignificant, which was significant before in some cases.
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4.4.4.1 Marginal effects of regime choice on government expenditure
This section discusses column 2 in Table 9. As the interaction effect is significant,
the marginal effect of regime choice on total government expenditure depends on
the level of trade openness. Moreover, as signs of the coefficients of regime choice 
and interaction term are opposite to each other, a threshold level of trade openness 
can be calculated, after which marginal effects will change sign. To find the 
threshold, we present the marginal effects of regime choice for each level of trade 
openness in a graph (see Figure 8).
It can be seen from Figure 8 that the marginal effects of regime choice on total 
government expenditure are positive and significant when trade openness is below 
27% of GDP; that is, at a low level of trade openness. The positive marginal effect 
implies that at a low level of trade openness, fixed regimes (flexible regimes) result 
in lower (higher) government expenditure. Marginal effect changes sign and 
becomes negative when trade openness is 56% or higher, at which point fixed 
regimes are associated with higher government expenditure. Negative marginal 
effects are significant when trade openness is 87% or higher. We have also 
calculated the marginal effects of regime choice on primary government expenditure 
and government consumption expenditure from column 4 in Table 9 and column 2 
in Table 10, respectively. The graphs of the marginal effects show similar patterns
as above.
All the above findings strongly suggest that the exchange rate regime choice has a
direct effect on fiscal outcomes, such as government budget balance and 
expenditure. Moreover, regime choice interacts with trade openness to affect fiscal 
outcomes. Conversely, trade openness has only an interaction effect on fiscal 
outcomes. Consequently, marginal effects of regime choice on fiscal variables 
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depend critically on the level of trade openness. At a low level of openness, fixed 
regimes result in a higher budget balance or lower government expenditure; that is,
fixed regimes have a more disciplinary effect. In contrast, when trade openness is 
high, flexible regimes are conducive for maintaining fiscal discipline.
4.5 Conclusion
Against the backdrop of high and persistent fiscal deficit and public debt marring 
several economies, this study addresses the role of exchange rate regime choice in 
disciplining fiscal policy. The theoretical literature strongly justifies the role of an 
exchange rate regime in disciplining fiscal policy outcomes, such as budget deficit
and government expenditure. However, considerable debate remains as to which
exchange rate provides more fiscal discipline. Empirical studies, which examine 
only the direct effect of an exchange rate regime choice on fiscal outcomes, also fail 
to provide a distinctive answer. In order to contribute to this debate, this study, for 
the first time, stresses that an exchange rate regime has a direct effect, as well as 
interaction effects through other variables, on fiscal outcomes. Particularly, we focus 
on the strong theoretical arguments regarding the direct effect of trade openness and 
CBI, which have increased significantly in recent decades, on fiscal discipline. Apart 
from the direct effect of exchange rate regimes, we hypothesise that both CBI and 
trade openness can moderate the effect of exchange rate regime choice, and thus can 
jointly affect fiscal outcomes.
In order to test the empirical validity of our hypotheses, we use two annual panel 
datasets covering the periods 1971 to 2000 and 1971 to 2007 for a large number of 
developed and developing countries. We use six measures of fiscal outcomes,
including overall government budget balance, primary budget balance, cash surplus,
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total government expenditure, primary expenditure and government consumption 
expenditure. We estimate our empirical model by pooled OLS, including year 
dummies, country specific time trends and with lags of all explanatory variables, to 
begin. We account for the endogeneity of exchange rate regime choice by using 
neighbours’ size-weighted exchange rate regimes as instruments and using the
limited information maximum likelihood estimation technique. The system GMM 
method with internal instruments has also been applied. Sub-sample analysis and 
separate pooled OLS estimation, including region fixed effects and region specific 
time tends, have also been conducted.
We find strong and robust evidence that exchange rate regime choice has a direct 
effect on fiscal outcomes, in that fixed regimes provide more fiscal discipline. This 
finding supports the conventional view, which associates fixed exchange rate 
regimes with more fiscal discipline (see Aghevli, Khan and Montiel 1991; Frenkel 
and Goldstein 1988). We also find convincing evidence for the hypothesis that trade 
openness interacts with regime choice to affect fiscal variables. Consequently, an 
exchange rate regime’s marginal effects on fiscal discipline depend critically on the 
level of a country’s trade openness. Particularly, we find that at low level of trade 
openness fixed regimes provide more fiscal discipline, and there is a threshold level 
of trade openness after which flexible regimes become more disciplinary. The 
effects are significant at a relatively low or high level of openness, but not for a
middle level of openness. These findings are in conformity with the theoretical idea 
of Magud (2010), who documents the shock-absorbing role of flexible regimes at a
high level of trade openness. Shock emanating from higher openness is 
accommodated by flexible regimes, and thus governments have to bear few
consequences of the shock.
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We do not find any evidence for our second hypothesis that CBI affects fiscal 
discipline through its effect on exchange rate regime. The direct effect of CBI on 
fiscal discipline is also not robust. This latter finding is consistent with the recent 
trend of soaring budget deficits in many OECD countries, where central banks enjoy 
reasonable degrees of independence. This may be because central bank activities are
not transparent enough and are difficult to monitor, especially in the short run 
(Bodea 2010). Consequently, CBI may not always imply independence of monetary 
policy over a government’s fiscal decision (Sargent 1999).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Variables, data sources and availability
Variables Description Data source
Fiscal variables
Overall budget balance Revenue minus expenditure excluding 
grant
1971–2000, GFS, IMF
Primary budget balance Overall budget balance net of interest 
payment
1971–2000, GFS, IMF
Cash surplus Similar to the overall balance except that 
net cash outflows from lending and 
repayment transactions are not subtracted
1971–2007, GFS, IMF
Total govt expenditure Total expenditure including interest 
payment
1971–2000, GFS, IMF
Primary govt 
expenditure
Total expenditure excluding interest 
payment
1971–2000, GFS, IMF
Govt consumption 
Expenditure
Government final consumption 
expenditure
1971–2007, WDI
Other variables
Regime Exchange rate regime choice, Reinhart-
Rogoff fine classification (1 to 14 scale),
higher values indicate more flexible 
regimes
1971–2007, Ilzetzki,
Reinhart and Rogoff
(2008)
Open Trade openness, the share of export and 
import of goods and services in GDP
1971–2007, Penn World 
Table version 6.3
TOR Central bank governor turnover rate,
higher TOR indicates lower CBI
1971–2007
CBI Legal central bank independence, 0 to 1 
index, higher value indicates higher CBI 
1980–2003
Level of development Log of per capita GDP in USD 1971- 2007, Penn World 
Table version 6.3
Polity Proxy for institutional quality 1971–2007, Polity IV 
database
LGDP Log of GDP in dollar measuring size of the 
economy 
WDI
Recession dummy Calculated by the author from log GDP
Output gap Calculated by the author from log GDP 
using H-P filter
Capital A/C Openness Capital account openness index (0 to 1),
higher values indicate higher levels of 
openness
1971–2007, Chinn and 
Ito (2008)
Neighbours’ Regime 
choice
Neighbours’ size weighted exchange rate 
regime, calculated by authors
Trade_neigh Neighbours’ trade share in overall trade,
calculated by authors
DOTS (IMF)
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Table 3: Average values of fiscal variables and exchange rate regime choice across regions
Regions Overall 
budget 
balance
Primary 
budget 
balance
Cash 
surplus
Regime 
choice
East Asia and Pacific -1.63
(4.47)
0.30
(4.87)
0.29
(4.92)
7.50
(4.25)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -1.95
(3.56)
0.48
(3.25)
-1.34
(4.79)
9.32
(3.99)
Latin America -3.72
(6.97)
-0.78
(5.54)
-2.00
(4.48)
7.91
(4.59)
Middle East and North Africa -3.26
(10.11)
-2.42
(5.89)
-0.90
(10.82)
6.91
(3.98)
South Asia -6.46
(4.09)
-3.89
(4.35)
-2.97
(3.08)
5.82
(2.67)
Sub-Saharan Africa -4.82
(5.36)
-2.49
(5.25)
-2.61
(4.84)
5.82
(4.52)
Western Europe and North America -3.88
(4.22)
-0.48
(3.54)
-2.29
(4.24)
6.51
(4.10)
Caribbean -2.44
(4.70)
0.07
(3.95)
-1.30
(2.80)
3.51
(3.33)
Note: For each region figures in the first rows are average values of respective column variables, while 
figures in the parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table 10: Interaction effects of exchange rate regime choice and CBI and trade 
openness on government consumption expenditure
Dependent variable: Government consumption expenditure
(1) (2) (2a) (2b) (2c)
OLS OLS 2SLS LIML System 
GMM
Regime 0.321* 0.298* 0.358** 3.011 0.155*
(0.169) (0.153) (0.180) (3.263) (0.082)
CBI -2.532* -3.120*** -3.121*** -4.108* -0.523
(1.393) (0.858) (0.852) (2.258) (0.333)
Regime* CBI -0.069
(0.148)
Open 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.354 0.017*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.370) (0.009)
Regime* Open -0.005*** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.040 -0.002*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.043) (0.001)
Common time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country specific time 
trend
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Other controls All
controls
All
controls
All 
controls
All 
controls
All 
controls
Instruments First lag of 
explanatory
variables as
instruments
Neighbours’
exchange 
rate and 
lag of endo var 
as 
instruments
Internal
instruments
Observations 3,374 3,374 3,357 3249 3396
R-squared 0.242 0.242 - - -
No of countries 126 126 126 120 126
Instruments 284
Hansen test 1
AR(2) p-val 0.734
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at country level in parentheses for all regressions except system 
GMM. Arellano-Bond (1991) robust standard errors are reported for system GMM, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls are recession dummy, level of development and capital account openness, 
all variables except recession dummy in column 1and 2 enter with a lag. Coefficient of lag dependent 
variable is not reported for system GMM results. All regressions use TOR as a measure of CBI.
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Figure 1: Exchange rate regime choice 
and overall budget balance conditional 
on trade openness
1a: Trade openness low
1b: Trade openness medium
1c: Trade openness high
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Figure 2: Exchange rate regime 
choice and overall budget balance 
conditional on CBI
2a: Governor TOR high (low CBI)
2b: Governor TOR medium (medium 
CBI)
2c: Governor TOR low (high CBI)
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of exchange rate regime choice on overall budget 
balance conditional on trade openness
Note: This graph is based on regression eight in Table 4, when both interaction between exchange 
rate regime choice and CBI (TOR) and trade openness are included.
Figure 4: Marginal effect of exchange rate regime choice on overall budget 
balance conditional on level of CBI (Governor TOR)
Note: This graph is based on regression eight in Table 4, when both interactions between exchange 
rate regime choice and CBI (TOR) and trade openness are included.
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Figure 5: Marginal effect of exchange rate regime choice on 
overall budget balance conditional on trade openness
Note: This graph is based on regression one in Table 4a, when only interaction between exchange 
rate regime choice and trade openness is included.
Figure 6: Marginal effect of exchange rate regime choice on 
primary budget balance conditional on trade openness
Note: This graph is based on regression two in Table 6, when only interaction between exchange rate 
regime choice and trade openness is included.
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Figure 7: Marginal effect of exchange rate regime choice on cash 
surplus conditional on trade openness
Note: This graph is based on regression four in Table 6, when only interaction between exchange rate 
regime choice and trade openness is included.
Figure 8: Marginal effect of exchange rate regime choice on total government 
expenditure conditional on trade openness
Note: This graph is based on regression two in Table 9, when only interaction between exchange rate 
regime choice and trade openness is included.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Exchange rate regime has always been at the heart of the contemporary history of 
the International Monetary System (IMS). Factors determining exchange rate regime 
choice and the macroeconomic consequences of that choice have been fundamental,
yet controversial, issues in the post-Bretton Woods (BW) era of IMS. This thesis has 
focused on some regime choice determinants that are theoretically important, yet
have received scant attention in empirical studies on exchange rate regime choice 
during the post-BW period.
More specifically, this thesis examined the role of capital account openness and 
financial sector health as crucial determinants of regime choice. In so doing, 
persistence of regime choice over time was also examined. Moreover, the thesis 
explored the role of product diversification and how its interactions with the three 
mechanisms of shock absorption, financial development and rent-seeking affect 
exchange rate regime choice. Further, this thesis also investigated the effect of 
exchange rate regime choice on fiscal discipline—an important and timely issue,
given the high and persistent budget deficits affecting many countries in recent 
years. To explore this issue, it is stressed that exchange rate has both direct effects
and interaction effects on fiscal discipline, through trade openness and CBI.
Given the limitations of the IMF de jure exchange rate regime classification, the
thesis adopted the Reinhart-Rogoff de facto or actual exchange rate classification in 
conjunction with a post-BW panel dataset for 178 countries covering the period 
from 1971 to 2007. Advanced econometric and statistical techniques were used to 
explore the identified issues of regime choice and its consequences.
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The first essay of the thesis finds strong evidence that exchange rate regime choice 
is relatively persistent over time. This suggests that previous years’ exchange rate 
regimes are a good predictor for the current year’s regime choice. It was also found 
that persistence of regime choice is particularly pertinent for low-income and high-
income countries. Interestingly, persistence is relatively low for middle-income 
countries, which suggests that this group of countries changes their exchange rate 
regimes relatively more often. Capital account openness appears to be a significant 
factor affecting exchange rate regime choice, such that higher capital account 
openness leads countries to adopt relatively fixed regimes. This finding applies to all 
country groups and is robust across different estimation techniques. The implication 
of this finding is that, as countries open their capital account, they prefer stability in 
their exchange rates.
There is also some evidence that financial sector development affects regime choice. 
This effect is such that financial sector development leads countries to use more 
flexible regimes—particularly in high-income and middle-income countries. Thus, 
countries with underdeveloped financial sectors are not good candidates for floating 
exchange rates. However, this finding is not always robust across estimation 
techniques and country groups. The effects of another measure of financial sector 
health—namely, financial fragility—on regime choice are not robust across different 
country groups and estimation techniques.
The second essay establishes that product diversification is an important determinant 
of exchange rate regime choice, in that more diversified economies tend to adopt 
more flexible regimes. Product diversification can thus act as a factor to mitigate the
fear of floating that is common among countries. There is also strong evidence that 
lower levels of diversification (i.e., concentration) leads to fixed regimes in 
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countries where the level of corruption is high. This may create more scope for rent-
seeking on the part of powerful elites in the developing countries for which this 
finding is more applicable. Product diversification is also more likely to lead to 
flexible exchange rate regimes in developing countries with lower levels of financial 
development. There is also some evidence that diversification facilitates the 
adoption of flexible regimes in countries that are experiencing greater shocks. 
Overall, the findings are more applicable for those developing countries that
experience high corruption, have low levels of financial development, and face high 
real shocks.
Finally, the third essay finds strong evidence that the exchange rate regime choice 
has both direct and indirect effects on fiscal discipline. Particularly, this essay finds
that regime choice interacts with trade openness to affect fiscal discipline. This
suggests that a regime choice’s effects on fiscal discipline depend on the levels of a
country’s trade openness. This finding is further explored by estimating the marginal 
effects of regime choice on fiscal discipline at different levels of trade openness. It is
found that fixed exchange rate regimes create fiscal discipline when a country’s
trade openness is lower. Conversely, flexible regimes become disciplinary when a
country is highly open to trade. This study does not find any evidence that regime 
choice interacts with CBI to influence fiscal discipline. Nor does it find robust 
evidence that CBI has any direct effect on fiscal discipline. These findings are 
consistent across different measures of fiscal outcomes and CBI, and are supported 
by several robustness checks.
